MASTER UMRAO SINGH Vs. S.P. KAUSHIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioner instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 420 from the Respondent who is his tenant as arrears of rent and also for ejectment from the premises in his occupation on the grounds of non -payment of rent, substantial damage to the premises and requirement by the landlord for his personal use. The Respondent controverted the allegations and pleaded that the rent demanded by the Petitioner was in excess of the standard rent. The suit was decreed by the trial court but on appeal it has been held that the standard rent of the premises was 13 -8 -0 per month and that the requirement of the Petitioner was not bona fide.

(2.) IT is common ground that the premises in dispute were in the tenancy at one time of Partap Singh who had one room, a kitchen and verandah. At that time proceedings for fixation of fair rent were taken and it was fixed at Rs. 12 per month. The premises which are in occupation of the Respondent consist of the same room and the verandah and a bath -room. In other words, instead of the kitchen, which formed part of the premises when it was let out to Partap Singh, a bath -room has been given to the Respondent. There can be no manner of doubt that if the present premises are the same for which the fair rent had been fixed, then the standard rent shall have to be determined according to it with certain amount of increase permissible under the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958. If, however, the premises are different now, the standard rent shall have to be determined afresh in accordance with the provisions contained in the aforesaid Act. The lower appellate Court was of the view that merely because the landlord has substituted bath -room which is smaller in size for a kitchen which was larger, the identity of the premises cannot be said to have been changed or destroyed. In the Rent Act by Megrry, Eighth Edition, the doctrine of the change of identity of the premises has been discussed at pages 103 to 105. It is stated that there must be something fundamental transforming the general structural character of the house as an entire entity in order to attract the doctrine of the change of identity and the change must be more radical than mere improvements or structural alterations or the blocking up of a connecting door and that the Court 'must be astute to see that the landlord is not evading the restrictions upon increases of rent imposed by the statute by...small, and possibly colourable, alterations of the structure, or by a mere sub -dividing of the tenement'. Nor will there necessarily be a change of identity if one room out of three is replaced by another room of a similar size in the same house, or if the area of the house and the site on which it stands are both increased, with the addition of an outside water -closet and the constructions of a paved yard. In Solle v. Butcher, (1949) 2 All. E.R. 1107, the landlord acquired a long lease of a war -damaged house and carried out repairs and alterations to the house, in the course of which he reconstructed the flat which was the subject -matter of the proceedings before the Court. The alterations left the outside and cubic capacity of the house and of the flat in question unchanged, the only substantial change made in the flat being the removal of inner walls so as to subtract from the bedroom a space which was then incorporated into the dining room. This flat including a garage which had not formed part of the demise, which was made earlier in 1939 of the same premises, was let out. The standard rent of the flat in 1939 was £ 140 a year but the flat as reconstructed together with the garage was let out at £ 250 a year. The question was whether the identity of the flat which had been previously let had changed owing to the structural alterations as also the inclusion of the garage. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the identity remained the same. In the present case it is obvious that there was hardly any change of identity and all that had happened was that instead of the kitchen which previously formed part of the tenancy premises, a bath -room was included in it. This would not amount to any such change of identity so as to make the premises in dispute different from those which was in occupation of Partap Singh when the fair rent was fixed. Mr. Narula has relied a good deal on a decision of Weston, C.J., in Attar Singh v. Kesho Ram Civil Revision No. 395 of 1950 made on 27th December, 1950, in which it was observed that the first letting of the premises in Clause 1(c)(ii) of the Second Schedule of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act of 1947 which was in force at that time must refer to the actual premises, be they the whole of a building or a part of a building, the standard rent of which was fixed. It is contended what has to be seen is which were let at the previous stage and whether exactly the same were being let at the subsequent stage. In other words, according to Mr. Narula, the rooms or the other amenities in a particular residential accommodation must identically and precisely be the same on both occasions to attract the applicability of the rule that there has been no change of identity. He says that in the present case instead of the kitchen a bath -room was included in the tenancy premises and thus the premises let to the Respondent were new. This is not a matter which engaged the attention of the learned Chief Justice in the case referred to and on facts that is clearly distinguishable. There a part of the middle storey had been let at one time to one Pehlad Singh. This consisted of four rooms and the point that had to be decided was whether there had been a partial letting of the premises for the purposes of Clause 1(c)(ii) of the Second Schedule. It was in that connection that the observations referred to before were made. I am therefore, satisfied that the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that there had been no change of identity is correct. If that be so, it is common ground that the standard rent of the premises would be Rs. 13 -8 -0 per month.

(3.) IN the result, this petition is dismissed, but in view of all the circumstances I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.