(1.) THE present revision petition has been directed against judgments passed by the Courts below whereby the respondents have been acquitted of the offence charged against them. Kuljit Singh petitioner initiated proceedings on accusations that Bhan Singh entered into an agreement to sell his land vide agreement dated 19.8.1998 and received Rs. 7,750/ - towards earnest money. The vendor agreed to execute the sale deed within one year of disposal of cases pending in regard to land. On 26.2.2002, Bhan Singh received another sum of Rs. 40,000/ - and the remaining amount of Rs. 68,500/ - was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed. Bhan Singh sold the land in question to Jasbir Singh and some other persons on the basis of sale deed scribed on 8.7.2002 and registered on 11.10.2002.
(2.) PERUSAL of judgments passed by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court would make it manifest that the Courts have recorded consistent findings of fact that the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code to hold the accused guilty for committing the said offence. The evidence led on record would reveal that Bhan Singh was the owner of the land which was allegedly agreed to be sold in favour of petitioner Kuljit Singh vide agreement dated 19.8.1998. Later Bhan Singh sold the said land in favour of Jasbir Singh etc. The petitioner could not lead any evidence that Bhan Singh made any dishonest representation to the petitioner at the time of entering into agreement to sell and receiving earnest money. It is not the plea of the petitioner that Bhan Singh was not the owner of the land on the day he agreed to sell the same in his favour. If Bhan Singh has committed any breach of terms and conditions of agreement to sell, the same in the present circumstances gives rise to civil dispute and the petitioner has already taken recourse to appropriate remedy available in law. I do not find any error much less illegality in the findings recorded by the Courts below in order to interfere in the judgment of acquittal when otherwise the scope of interference in a judgment of acquittal stands on an entirely different footing than that of intervention in a judgment of conviction. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the petition is dismissed in limine.