LAWS(P&H)-2013-1-88

GHULLA SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

Decided On January 15, 2013
Ghulla Singh Appellant
V/S
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant herein had filed application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming certain monetary benefits. Precisely, his claim was for payment of salary for 1.8.1992 to 30.9.2001 along with interest @ 18% per annum. This claim was made in the following backdrop. The appellant had been working with the respondents on daily wage basis. His services were terminated on 1.10.1987. He challenged the termination on the ground that he was appointed against a permanent post and the services were terminated without holding any inquiry or issuing show-cause notice. A settlement was arrived at between the parties on 8.4.1988 under Section 12(3) of the Act. Grievance of the appellant was that in spite of this settlement, he was not allowed to join duties and, therefore, on the basis of this settlement, he became entitled to full salary for the period in question. On that basis, application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act was filed. The learned Labour Court rejected the application as not maintainable holding that the proceedings under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings and unless a pre-existing right is established, such an application would not be maintainable. The Labour Court, inter alia, recorded in the impugned order that no settlement was produced by the appellant and there was also a dispute as to whether the appellant wanted to join the duties, but was not allowed to join the duties or it was the fault of the appellant in not joining the duties. The appellant preferred writ petition challenging the order of the Labour Court. This writ petition has also been dismissed by the learned single Judge vide judgment dated 20.1.2011. It is recorded in the impugned judgment that when the appellant was maintaining that he was not allowed to join the duties, he was permitted to take his Advocate along with him. When the appellant was questioned as to what happened after the appellant had reported for duty along with his Advocate, his reply was that he was being permitted to join the duties as a daily wager, but that was not acceptable to the appellant. as he was employed on permanent basis. In a situation like this, it becomes important to find out as to on what terms settlement dated 8.4.1988 was arrived at between the parties.

(2.) As pointed out above, the appellant was working on daily wage basis when his services were terminated. Therefore, whether in the said settlement dated 8.4.1988, it was agree that he would be taken in service on daily wage basis or regular basis could be found out only from the said settlement. The settlement was not produced before the Court. The terms of the settlement are not known. In a case like this, when the dispute is as to whether the appellant, pursuant to the said settlement, was entitled to join the duties on regular basis or the stand of the management was correct, namely, allowing him to join the duties on daily wage basis, it could be adjudicated only by means of reference under Section 10 of the Act and could not be settled under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act, more particularly in the absence of the terms of settlement before the Court. Therefore, the Courts below had no option but to dismiss the application on the aforesaid ground.

(3.) We find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. Though there is a substantial delay in filing as well as re-filing the appeal, since we have dismissed the appeal on merits, we are not entertaining those applications.