(1.) By way of this order, we shall dispose of CWP Nos. 2844 and 13354 of 1995. Facts have been taken from CWP No. 2844 of 1995. The petitioner, a manufacturer of starch etc., prays for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing notice dated 28.1.1995, notification dated 31.5.1993 and prays that exemption granted after amendment of Rule 30(5) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (General) Rules, 1962 (in short, the Rules), may be declared to operate retrospectively.
(2.) Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner imports maize from outside the State of Haryana and is, therefore, not liable to pay market fee whether on the definition of processing contained in Section 2(NN) or under Rule 30(5) (as amended on 29.4.1988) of the Rules. It is further contended that by mere insertion of the words "manufacturing" by the State of Haryana in Section 2(NN) of the Act, vide notification dated 29.4.1988, the respondents cannot demand market fee from 1.4.1987 to 29.4.1988. The demand raised in the impugned notice, for the period 1.4.1987 to 28.4.1988 is, therefore, null and void. It is further submitted that exemption from payment of market fee granted under rule 30(5), notified on 31.5.1993, should be given retrospective effect from 29.4.1988, the date of amendment of Section 2(NN) of the Act. The petitioner was pursuing the matter with the State of Haryana since amendment of Section 2(NN), but as the notification granting exemption was issued after delay, the notification should be ordered to operate retrospectively.
(3.) Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 submits that notification dated 31.5.1993 amending Rule 30(5) of the Rules is prospective in operation and, therefore, cannot, by a process of judicial interpretation, be assigned retrospective effect from 29.4.1988. It is further submitted that delegated legislation, i.e., the rule making power can only be exercised retrospectively if the parent statute confers power on the delegatee to notify a rule retrospectively. In the absence of any such power, conferred by the parent Act and specific intent expressed in the notification that the amendment shall be prospective, the petitioner's contentions are ill founded and may, therefore, be rejected. However, to a specific query as to how demand has been raised from 1.4.1987, when Section 2(NN) was amended to provide for payment of market fee with effect from 29.4.1988, counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 is unable to advance any worthwhile argument, in support of the show cause notice demanding market fee from 1.4.1987.