MUSADI LAL Vs. GIRRAJ PARSHAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The landlord had sought for eviction on the ground of personal necessity to allow for the property to be used for his son who was an Advocate in practice for nearly 10 years and also had a plea that the tenant was guilty of ceasing to occupy the premises for a period in excess of four months, the statutory period. The Courts below found the grounds as established and ordered ejectment. Learned Senior counsel reads to me the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent Act, 1973 to contend that the provision could be that the landlord could be evicted only if the son intends to practice "as a lawyer" and for a person who is already a practitioner the provision cannot apply. The said Section would require to be reproduced for a better understanding:-

(2.) It must be noticed that this provision itself was introduced by Act 16 of 1976 in response to decisions on this subject from several Courts with conflicting views. The previous cases had been with reference to whether a person who takes a property for residential purpose could be taken as subjecting it to non-residential purpose by having an office as a lawyer. The conflict in views was in the context of prohibition under the various rent enactments by conversion of residential building for non-residential purpose and vice versa. The issue therefore was whether the use of a portion of the premises constituted a non-residential use that fell within the interdict of conversion of building from residential to non-residential building. The Haryana Act has also undergone a change for allowing for eviction as a ground for landlord in respect of residential building for the purpose of a son who intended to start practice.

(3.) The expression "intends to start practice" is a syntactical expression that cannot conceal an intendment of the legislature. Learned Senior counsel would argue that intendment was to restrict a requirement of a landlord only if his son was going to start practice in future and cannot be used for a person who has already begun his practice. In my view, it will lead to absurd situation that commencement of a profession which is a sure guarantee as fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution must suffer fetter through alleged legislative intendment in a State statute. The intendment of law must be for perceived by reading any state law to conform to the constitutional guarantees. If therefore, a person had a right to carry on his profession, the law cannot impose a new condition that the landlord who wants this premises must literally stop his son from practicing, secure his possession and then the son must commence his practice. It amounts to putting an artificial barrier to a constitutional right. The expression, in my view, must be understood as only a need for a landlord for the son who may have started his profession or who may start his profession in future. It is a common experience that no action for eviction, although a summary procedure prescribed under the Rent Acts, do not see the light of the day within few years. Litigation lingers on for several years. If the interpretation as propounded by the learned Senior counsel were to be accepted it would mean even in a genuine case of landlord approaching the Court when his son was intending to start a practice by the time the petition for eviction is concluded after a few years, the son would have completed his course and must be waiting to start his business to obtain eviction of the premises. I have already outlined the absurdity of the situation that is likely to result if such an interpretation is to be given. I therefore, discard the argument and hold that the Section must be understood for both types of situation of a person who has already commenced his profession and who may commence his profession after filing of the petition.