SURAJ BHAN Vs. KRISHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE revision is by the tenant against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller as affirmed by the appellate authority. The Rent Controller urged for two grounds for eviction: (i) nonpayment of rent, (ii) material impairment. The claim to eviction on the ground of material impairment was rejected by the Rent Controller and there was no modification of the said finding in the appellate Court. The tenant, however, was evicted only on the finding of the Rent Controller that the tenant had not paid rent for September, 1992. In this case, the defence was that he had paid upto September, 1992 and also paid Rs. 200/ - more. When there was a defence that there was no liability at all, the tenant did not feel constrained to deposit any amount at the first hearing. There had also been no provisional assessment of rent or provisional liability by the Rent Controller during the pendency of the proceedings. It was only during a final adjudication that the Rent Controller found that the case set up by the tenant was not acceptable and held that the tenant had not paid rent for September, 1992. Before the judgment was delivered on 19.08.1998, it appears that the tenant moved an application for reception of additional evidence for proof of having paid rent for September, 1992 as well. The Rent Controller rejected the application on 18.08.1998 and passed an order of eviction on 19.08.1998. In the appeal filed before the appellate authority, the tenant contended that the finding recorded by the Rent Controller that he was in default for September 1992 was itself not correct and it was not also justified in rejecting an opportunity to the tenant to prove that he had actually paid the rent for the said month as well and he had a receipt issued by the landlord. He complained therefore that the Rent Controller was not justified in rejecting the document out of reckoning and not allowing for additional evidence to be brought on record. The appellate authority rejected this plea as well, holding that the tenant had not filed revision against the order of rejection of the additional evidence and, therefore, he was barred from contending that he did not have any opportunity to produce additional evidence. The appellate authority, therefore, proceeded to affirm the decision of the Rent Controller to uphold the order of eviction already passed.

(2.) I find the reasoning of the appellate authority and approach of the trial Court to be erroneous. When the issue was whether the tenant had paid rent for a particular month and he was trying to produce documentary evidence for the same, it ought to have under the normal circumstances provided an opportunity to establish through documentary evidence. If the Rent Controller found that the tenant had not been diligent in producing the document at the earliest time, the best reparation would have been to award costs. It had hardly allowed for any time for a tenant to challenge the order for it proceeded to dispose of the rent petition on the following day on 19.08.1998. Under such circumstances when the tenant was contending in appeal that he did not have an appropriate opportunity, the appellate authority was equally wrong in finding that without filing a civil revision against the order of rejection of his plea for additional evidence, he shall not be permitted to urge the correctness of the order of the Rent Controller. This was not setting out the law correctly, for, Section 105 CPC provides for a right to a party to plead that a particular finding rendered against him was not also correctly decided in a regular appeal, although no revision had been filed against such an interim order. The rent control proceedings are not strictly governed by Civil Procedure Code. However, Section 105 itself makes possible an expansive approach and it should have been applied to a party, who has suffered an adverse order at an interlocutory stage and I would apply the same principle as also applicable to the rent control proceedings. If the Rent Controller had not allowed for such an opportunity, the appellate Court could not have refused that opportunity.