NARINDER KUMAR GOYAL Vs. NAVNEET KAUR GILL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The revision is against the rejection of a plea for leave to defend in an action for eviction brought by the landlord under the special provisions of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as extended to the city of Chandigarh. The leave to defend was rejected and the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, at the forefront of his submissions contends that there is a challenge to the extension of the provision to city of Chandigarh in the Supreme Court and the case is pending. He cites before me an instance of how a co-equal Bench of this Court had allowed for protection of possession of a tenant in a Civil revision No. 2545 of 2012. A statutory provision which allows for certain special privileges so long as it is in the statute there is a presumption that the law is intra vires. A presidential notification which is extended to a Union Territory is also presumed to be valid till it is shown otherwise. If there is a challenge before the Supreme Court, unless the Supreme Court itself has stayed the operation of the notification for all the properties in Chandigarh, it shall not be possible to any tenant to plead that he shall have the benefit of order of stay. It shall be open to the petitioner himself to approach the Supreme Court to secure suitable orders if he has a case for it but he will not have a reason to cite the institution of a case by some other person as a ground to seek for suspension of the notification. I do not think that the landlord should fetter himself by a restraint to a statutory provision which is very much available for him to make use of. A summary adjudication in the application to leave to defend is an intervention by a Court to see whether there exists something tenable for consideration and the statutory provision providing for a fast track should be suspended for the benefit of the person who seeks such leave and allow for a full fledged contest. The landlord in this case has sought for eviction of the tenant under the provision for her own personal need. The status of landlord as NRI is not in dispute. The contention, however, is that the tenant is in possession of only the ground floor and the building has two other storeys and the landlord is really applying for ejectment to secure an additional accommodation. According to him, accommodation at the first and second floor are themselves sufficient for the landlord. The sufficiency of accommodation cannot be a defence for the tenant to plead if the construction is integral whole of the remaining property and the landlord is not shown to be in possession of any other building or that any other property is vacant, the other portion of the same building which may be vacant can not be a ground for a tenant to suspect the bona fides of the landlord. The other line of defence which is taken by the tenant is that the power of attorney holder does not have a power to institute the case. It is a flimsy argument for a tenant to take. It is not uncommon that NRI landlord resorts to Court through a local resident Indians to prosecute the case and to that extent the device of power of attorney to institute a case cannot be a ground for a tenant to plead that the power of attorney is not valid. I do not find any tenable defence for a tenant to allow for a leave to defend and if the Court below has refused leave, I will find no error to interfere in revision.

(2.) The order which is challenged is maintained and the revision petition is dismissed. Time for eviction is granted for one month.