VARINDER KUMAR GUPTA Vs. M/S. CREATIVE CLOTHING

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AS identical questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to dispose of above indicated petitions, to quash the impugned complaints & summoning orders, by means of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition. However, the epitome of the facts, which requires a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petitions, has been extracted from (1) CRM No. M -600 of 2012, titled as "Varinder Kumar Gupta and others v. M/s. Creative Clothing" for ready reference in this context. The matrix of the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for deciding the present petitions and emanating from the record, is that initially, complainant -respondent M/s Creative Clothing(for brevity "the complainant") has filed the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter to be referred as the 'N.I. Act') read with Section 420 IPC, inter alia, pleading that the petitioners -accused are the Directors of M/s. Koutons Retail India Limited (accused No. 1). The impugned cheques issued by the accused in order to discharge their legal and enforceable liability were dishonoured. They did not make the payment of the impugned amount, despite legal notices within a statutory period. Thus, they have committed the indicated offences.

(2.) TAKING cognizance of the complaint (Annexure P -1), the trial Court summoned the petitioners -accused, to face the trial for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, by virtue of impugned summoning order dated 07.04.2011 (Annexure P -2). The similar impugned summoning orders were passed as well in the other connected cases instituted on similar private complaints.

(3.) THE case, inter alia, set -up by the petitioners -accused, in brief in so far as relevant is that, the complainants have filed the false complaints against them. They have been arrayed as accused only in the capacity of Directors of the Company, without pleading therein that they are, in any way, responsible for the commission of the offences in question, as contemplated under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. The trial Court was stated to have mechanically summoned them without the application of mind, by way of non -speaking impugned summoning orders. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners -accused sought to quash the impugned complaints and summoning orders, in the manner described here -in -above.