SOHAN SINGH Vs. PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has invoked the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prays for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of the order dated 19.4.2012, Annexure P3, passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Ludhiana whereby his services while under probation have been dispensed with. Further challenge is to the order dated 16.11.2012, Annexure P4, whereby his service appeal against the order of discharge has been rejected.

(2.) The petitioner was appointed as Clerk purely on temporary basis vide order dated 21.5.2010, Annexure P1. As per terms and conditions of the letter of appointment, the petitioner was to remain on probation for a period of two years. He was placed under suspension vide order dated 5.4.2012 and thereafter served with a charge sheet dated 10.4.2012 under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 read with Rule 12, Chapter 18-A of High Court Rules and Orders, Volume-I raising a specific article of charge. The charge sheet contained the statement of imputation as also the list of witnesses and list of documents. Prior to the petitioner having responded to the charge sheet, the impugned order dated 19.4.2012 has been passed dispensing him from service holding his work and conduct to be not satisfactory during the period of his probation. Insofar as his suspension period is concerned, the same has been directed to be treated as "non duty".

(3.) Mr.GC Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the impugned order is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. It is contended that once the charge sheet had been issued levelling allegations of misconduct, it was incumbent upon the respondent-Authorities to have afforded a chance to the petitioner to furnish a response thereto and to conduct an enquiry into the allegation prior to forming an opinion to dispense with his services. It has been argued that the action of dropping the enquiry in the light of passing of the impugned order actually amounts to a methodology of having adopted a "short-cut" and such action is impermissible in law. That apart, it has been argued that on the face of it, the impugned order refers ostensibly to certain penalties that were imposed upon the petitioner and as such, the same is not an order of discharge simpliciter, but the same is stigmatic.