AMAR NATH Vs. RAJIV SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondent had faced the trial in complaint filed by the applicant under Sec. 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('Act' for short). The Trial Court vide judgment dated 5.8.2013 acquitted the respondent of the charge framed against him. Hence, the present application under Sec. 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Cr.P.C.' for short) praying for leave to appeal by the complainant.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and have gone through the record available on the file carefully.

(3.) Applicant had filed the complaint against the respondent under Sec. 138 of the Act with regard to dishonour of cheque dated 16.4.2009 in the sum of Rs. 3,50,000.00. The learned Trial Court, while acquitting the respondent of the charge framed against him, has held that respondent when examined under Sec. 313 Crimial P.C., had stated that the cheque in question had been given by him in blank as security to the son of the complainant with whom he was running a partnership business. However, the said cheque had been misused by the son of the complainant and the complaint in question was got filed through the complainant. CW-2 Amarjit Singh in his cross-examination admitted that the accused and the son of the complainant were running a partnership business. Complainant, however, denied his knowledge to the effect that his son was running a partnership business with the respondent. The Trial Court in this regard rightly held that a stranger i.e. CW-2 knew about the fact that the respondent and the son of the complainant were running a partnership business but the complainant had feigned ignorance in this regard. The Trial Court has further observed that a perusal of Mark A revealed that huge withdrawals had been made by the complainant in a short span of time. Hence, the Trial Court rightly concluded that the withdrawals had been made by the complainant for some other purpose and not for advancing loan to the respondent. The reasons given by the learned Trial Court, while acquitting the respondent, are sound reasons. Learned counsel for the applicant has failed to point out any misreading of evidence on record by the Trial Court which would warrant interference by this Court.