(1.) THIS petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, 'the Code') challenges order dated 10.10.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon allowing the appeal of the plaintiff-respondents and its application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code holding that the defendant-petitioner was liable to be restrained from interfering in peaceful possession of the plaintiff- respondents.
(2.) BRIEF facts of the case are that plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction alleging that they have executed a power of attorney dated 10.10.1995 in favour of the defendant-petitioner which was cancelled on 21.7.1997. It is further alleged that the defendant-petitioner has forged a lease deed dated 17.6.1997 with regard to the suit land after obtaining signature of the plaintiff-respondents on some blank papers. A declaration has been sought that the aforementioned lease deed is null and void and that the plaintiff-respondents are owners in possession of the suit land. An application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code was also filed with the pleadings that plaintiff-respondent 1 had entered into an agreement dated 8.9.1995 to sell the land measuring 10 kanals 4 marlas for a total consideration of Rs. 8,27,396/- and earnest amount of Rs. 5,27,396/- had already been paid through cheques. It is further alleged that plaintiff- respondents 2 and 3 had also executed agreement to sell the land for a sale consideration of Rs. 8,27,395/- each and they have also received the entire consideration amount by cheques and the possession was delivered to the defendant-petitioner. The defendant-petitioner also took the stand that plaintiff-respondent had already sold 10 marlas of land vide sale deed dated 24.1.1989 to one Prabhu Pritam Dass and, therefore, they have committed a criminal offence. The agreement to sell and general power of attorney dated 8.9.1995 and 10.10.1995 were irrevocable and could not be cancelled. The application was dismissed by the trial Court by observing that the signatures of the executant on the agreement were admitted and the dispute was whether the signatures were obtained on blank papers or the executant had actually executed the documents. The trial Court concluded that once the signatures have not been denied the version of the plaintiff-respondents that the signatures were obtained on blank papers is a matter of evidence and, therefore, the application was dismissed.
(3.) MR . Sudhir Aggarwal, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner has argued that the trial Court has taken the correct view by taking into consideration the validity of all the documents, namely, power of attorney dated 10.10.1995 and its cancellation dated 21.7.1997, lease deed dated 17.6.1997 and agreement to sell dated 8.9.1995. According to the learned counsel, the defendant-petitioner has been given possession in pursuance to the lease deed dated 17.6.1997 and, therefore, no interim direction could have been issued by the learned lower Appellate Court.