JAGDISH PARSHAD Vs. LAXMI NARAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1909 is directed against the order dated 27.1.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Narnaul dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff- petitioner, in which the order dated 15.6.2001 was impugned. The Civil Judge in his order dated 15.6.2001 has dismissed the application of the plaintiff- petitioner for issuance of interim directions restraining the defendant- respondents from alienating, creating charge of any kind on and from the houses in dispute or forcibly ousting the plaintiff-petitioner from the houses in dispute. The prayer was made in the suit seeking relief of permanent injunction. The aforementioned relief was sought on the basis of the undertaking dated 1.12.1998 made by the defendant-petitioner, wherein the defendant-respondent No. 1 had consented before the Court of Additional District Judge, Narnaul that he would dispose of the property in question after obtaining consent of the plaintiff-petitioner. Both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that the afore-mentioned order would not lead to the conclusion that the defendant-respondent No. 1 is not the owner of the demised property and, therefore, defendant-respondent No. 1 can alienate the same in accordance with law. The views of the learned Appellate Court is based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar and another v. Ram Parkash and others, 1988(2) RRR 288 (SC) : AIR 1988 SC 576 and a judgment of this Court in the case of Darshan Singh v. Harbhajan Singh, 1992(2) RRR 374 (P&H) : 1992 PLJ 573. The learned Additional District Judge has considered the statement dated 11.12.1998 made by defendant-respondent before the District Judge, Narnaul in some earlier litigation and has opined as under :-

(2.) MR . R.M. Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has repeated the same argument before me that once the defendant-respondent has suffered a statement before the learned Additional District Judge on 11.12.1989, then the afore-mentioned statement and compromise is binding on him and the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff-petitioner should have been granted. The learned counsel has pointed out that if the defendant-respondent is not held bound by his statement then the compromise decree based on 11.12.1998 would be a waste paper.

(3.) WHEN the facts of the instant case are examined in the light of the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it becomes evident that the property in dispute is prima facie found to be joint Hindu property and the suit has been filed by the plaintiff-petitioner, who is son of defendant- respondent No. 1. Therefore, no order of injunction could be passed against the Karta of the family because prima facie such a suit would not be even maintainable. The legal necessity cannot remain static and it is for the karta of the Joint Hindu Family to decide about the existence of legal necessity or use the property as an act of good management. The order dated 11.12.1998 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Narnaul cannot remain binding on the defendant-respondent for all times to come. Therefore, the instant petition is devoid of any merit and is, thus, liable to be dismissed.