LAWS(P&H)-2003-5-192

HAKAM SINGH Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER

Decided On May 14, 2003
HAKAM SINGH Appellant
V/S
PRESIDING OFFICER Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HAKAM Singh, petitioner, has filed this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned award dated 5.11.1986 (Annexure P -2) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Union Territory Chandigarh, vide which the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner was decided against him and it was held that he voluntarily abandoned the service of the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent Management'), who was left with no other alternative but to terminate his service.

(2.) THE petitioner was working as a Driver with the respondent Management. He applied for earned leave from 8.12.1977 to 14.12.1977 on account of stomach pain. The leave was sanctioned and he was supposed to join his duties on 15.12.1977. However, he neither joined his duties after the expiry of leave period nor he sent any application for extension of leave. Thereafter, the respondent Management sent information at his address given in the application through a telegram requiring him to join his duties at once. However, the petitioner was not found available at the address mentioned. Thereafter, notice was published in the daily English news paper 'The Tribune' dated 13.1.1978. But in spite of the publication of the said notice, the petitioner did not join his duties. Therefore, the respondent Management terminated his services on 28.1.1978. Against his termination order, the petitipner preferred an appeal to the Home Secretary, which was dismissed on 23.3.1979. Thereafter, the petitioner remained silent for about six years. On 28.2.1985, he served a demand notice on the respondent Management, as a result of which an industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court to the effect as to whether the services of the petitioner were terminated illegally by the respondent management, if so, to what effect and to what relief he is entitled to?

(3.) WHILE assailing the aforesaid award, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner was a nullity because of violation of rule of natural justice, as no enquiry was held before terminating the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that for terminating the services of the petitioner even on the ground of voluntary abandonment of the services, it was incumbent upon the respondent Management to hold an enquiry. If the services of the petitioner were terminated without holding an enquiry, it was not only violative of principles of natural justice, but also contrary to the provisions of Section 25 (F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.