MS. UJJWAL SAHRAWAT Vs. RAVEE SAHRAWAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question for decision in this Miscellaneous application is as to whether the petitioner -appellant was prevented by sufficient reasons from filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The order of divorce was passed by Additional District Judge, Chandigarh on January, 1991. The present appeal was filed on June 15, 1991 alongwith the application filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.

(2.) After excluding the time spent in obtaining certified copy of the judgment, the appeal is delayed by five months and six days. The ground urged for condonation of delay, briefly, is that the husband had started living with the wife after the divorce proceedings were transferred to Chandigarh under orders of Supreme Court. The husband had assured the wife that the divorce petition would be got dismissed as withdrawn. The husband, thus, started living with the wife and also signed the petrol book maintained for the car and the school exercise books of the daughter on different dates. It was on April 27, 1991, that the husband produced photostat copy of the order passed by the Court that the petitioner come to know of the divorce decree and thereafter she obtained certified copies and filed the appeal. At this stage, it would be noticed that earlier a petition under Sec. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by the husband at Chandigarh, which was withdrawn in May 1986. The wife was taken to Ranchi by the husband where she stayed for about two months and the second petition under Sec. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed at Ranchi in December, 1986. It was this petition which was got transferred at the instance of the wife under orders of the Supreme Court to Chandigarh. While contesting the petition, the husband has more or less admitted having signed the car book and the school exercise books of daughters of the parties. However, according to him, this was done at one go.

(3.) Although several facts were sought to be raised with regard to fraud, if any, committed on the wife to keep her in the house and not the prosecute the petition, which was pending in the court. However, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to make any comment thereon. As and when subsequently the occasion arises, the matter can be looked into While deciding the appeal itself. The parties would be at liberty to raise any ground at that time for the purpose of deciding this application the only question is as to whether the petitioner came to know of the decree of divorce on April 27, 1991, and she could not file the appeal earlier. It was sought to be explained that in the trial court the petitioner was throughout represented by counsel and the knowledge of the date of decree should be attributed to the petitioner. In ordinary circumstances this could be so. However, it is the petitioner's case that she was kept away from the court at the instance of the husband, who had started living with her during the pendency of the proceedings of the petition and had assured her for its withdrawal. The fact cannot be lost sight of that the earlier petition was also got dismissed as withdrawn, which was filed by the husband. The husband had signed the school exercise books of the daughter. Prima facie, it would appear that he did so on the respective dates. The story put forth by the petitioner that her husband started living with her, thus, cannot be ruled out straightway. Further comment, again, in this respect is not being made as it will be assumed for the purpose of decision of this petition that the petitioner came to know of the decree on April 27,1991, and, thus, she had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier.