RAJENDER KUMAR S I Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) FULL Bench was constituted to reconcile the conflict of judicial opinion if any, with regard to availability of benefits of military service under the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965. Whereas benefits flowing from the Rules with regard to period commencing from October 20, 1962 upto January 10, 1968 (for brevity of reference called first period of Emergency) as also for the period commencing with effect from December 3, 1971 upto its currency (called second period of Emergency) were accorded to one Amar Singh by a Single Judge of this Court in case titled "amar Singh v. The Secretary to Punjab Government, Soil Conservation, at Chandigarh, 1984 (1) S. L. R. 31 and one Indraj Singh in case titled Civil Writ Petition No. 82 of 1974 titled "indraj Singh v. The State of Haryana etc , C. W. P. 82 of 1984, benefits for the second period of emergency were declined to one Sukhdev Singh by a Division Bench of this Court in case "state of Punjab v. Sukhdev Singh, 1990 (7) S. L R. 731. " The Division Bench in the aforesaid case while declining the relief for the second period of emergency relied upon decision rendered by the Supreme Court in "dhan Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 1991 (l) S. L. R. 200". The fact that decision rendered by the Single Judge in Indraj Singh's case (supra) was upheld in Letters Patent Appeal which order, in turn, was upheld by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition filed by the State was, however, not brought to the notice of the Division Bench dealing with Sukhdev Singh's case (supra ).

(2.) THE facts of the case need not be given in all its details as the same find mention in the order of reference. Suffice, however, to say that petitioner having been selected in the Indian Air Force, joined the said wing of the Armed Forces on June 21, 1963 and continued to serve upto November 17, 1972. The first emergency was declared on October 26, 1962 which continued upto January 10, 1968. On December 3, 1971, the President of India again proclaimed emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution of India on account of external aggression vide notification No. GSR-1789 published in the Gazette of Government of India dated December 3, 1971. The petitioner was given the benefits of military service in his new assignment after discharge from army but was not given any benefit for the period subsequent to January 1968. The initial stand of the petitioner was that he is entitled to the benefit of entire period of service that he rendered in Air Force i. e. upto the date of his discharge. Later, however, he confined his entitlement for the period commencing with effect from December 3, 1971 upto November 17 1972 i. e. upto the time he remained in Air Force. The benefit of service rendered by the petitioner in Air Force confined to the first period of emergency was granted to him by the respondents whereas such benefit for the second period of emergency was declined.

(3.) MR. R. A. Yadav, counsel appearing for the State at the very threshold contends that there is no necessity at all to go into the question de novo as the Supreme Court in Dhan Singh and other's case (supra) has clearly held that benefits of military service are available to only those who are enrolled or commissioned during the period of emergency and not to those who joined before emergency i. e. October 26, 1962, He further contends that Supreme Court in " (Ex) Capt Randhir Singh Dhull v. Shri S. D. Bhambri , 1981 (1) S. L. R. 384" has held that military benefit for seniority, promotion and increments is admissible only in respect of military service rendered during the operation of emergency and not for any military service after the termination of emergency. The judgment dealing with the extent and scope of military service as defined under Rule 2 of 1965 Rules are detailed judgments and the conclusions have been arrived at after noticing the rival contentions of the parties. Inasmuch as judgment in Indraj Singh's case (supra) was upheld in appeal by the Letters Patent Bench without expressing any opinion as the appeal preferred by the State was dismissed in limine, as also for the reason that the Supreme Court upheld the orders passed by the Letters Patent Bench by dismissing the appeal of the State in limine without dealing with the matter would not advance the case of the petitioner as the said orders can have no binding precedent nor are law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The mere fact that the Division Bench of this Court in Sukhdev Singh and another's case did not notice the orders passed by the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal or the orders passed by the Supreme Court would not make any difference, contends the learned counsel.