(1.) The respondent filed an application for ejectment against the petitioner before the learned Rent Controller on the ground that the petitioner had failed to pay the rent due. This case came up before the learned Rent Controller on January 25, 1977, when the following order was passed :-
(2.) Thereafter, for a large number of hearings, the learned Presiding Officer did not attend the Court and he assessed the rent and costs for the first time on September 7, 1977. On that day, the following order was passed :-
(3.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The order dated January 25, 1977 passed by the learned Rent Controller, which has been extracted above, indicates that the case had been expressly adjourned on the first date of hearing for the purpose of assessment of rent and filing of reply to the petition for ejectment. The learned Rent Controller assessed the rent due and costs, for the first time on September 7, 1977, and adjourned the case to September 21, 1977, to enable the tenant-petitioner to make a tender, which was duly done. The learned Advocate for the respondent, who accepted the rent etc. under protest, did not raise an objection that the tender had been made after the statutory period. The only objection raised was that the tender made was short and this objection is apparently without any merit. The proceedings indicate that the tenant-petitioner was prepared to tender arrears of rent and costs on the first date of hearing because had it not been so, the learned Rent Controller would not have adjourned the case "for assessment". This assessment was made for the first time on September 7, 1977, whereafter a tender was made within the stipulated time. The trouble seems to have arisen on account of the adjournments granted by the learned Rent Controller himself. It is settled law that no party can be prejudiced because of some act or omission on the part of a Presiding Officer. If the learned Rent Controller himself took about 8 months to assess the rent and costs, etc., the tenant-petitioner could not be penalised for the delay committed by him. In the circumstances, the view taken by the Appellate Authority cannot be justified either on principle or on authority.