DARSHAN KAUR Vs. MALOOK SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MALOOK Singh obtained an ex parte decree of divorce against his wife Darshan Kaur from the Court of Additional District Judge, Allahabad on 15-11-1976. When she came to know of the decree, she filed an appeal in the Allahabad High Court, which was barred by time by 366 days and was consequently dismissed as such on 1-2-1980. On 19-4-1980, Darshan Kaur filed a petition under S. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the grant of permanent alimony against Malook Singh in the Court of District Judge, Jullundur, in which it was recited that the decree of divorce was passed by the Additional District Judge, Allahabad and the appellant's appeal failed before the Allahabad High Court. She pleaded that the husband had six Killas of land having value at the rate of RS. 35,000/- per Killa out of which on one Killa there was an orchard and tubewell was installed. The respondent had 20 Tolas of gold ornaments and was employed as Editor, Paper Lok Lahar and was drawing RS. 800/- per month besides getting military pension amounting to RS. 350/- was pleaded that the respondent voluntarily resided and worked for gain in village Gari Baksha, District Jullundur. Claim for RS. 500/- per month for permanent alimony was made. The petition was contested by Malook Singh, who took up a preliminary objection that since the decree of divorce was passed by the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, only that Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition. He also denied if he owned any land or had gold ornaments in his possession. He also denied that he was Editor of Lok Lahar and was getting any salary from that paper. He pleaded that he was getting RS. 60/- per month as pension from Air Force. In reply to para 5 he admitted that he resided in village Garhi Baksha, District Jullundur. The Court below struck the following preliminary issue. "whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition? ' The Court below relied on Seeta Ram v. Smt. Phooli, AIR 1972 Raj 313 and A. R. Munuswamy v. Hamsa Rani, AIR 1975 Mad 15, in coming to the conclusion that it is the Court which granted the decree of divorce, which alone had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 25 of the Act and thus concluded that the District Court at Jullundur had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under 25 of the Act. Consequently, her petition was dismissed vide order dated 18-10-1980. This is Darshan Kaur's appeal to this Court.

(2.) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to succeed. The Court below only considered Section 25 of the Act in deciding the preliminary issue and did not give due importance to S. 19 of the Act. Section 19 and 25 of the Act are as under :-

(3.) A reading of Section 19 clearly shows that every petition under the Act (which will include a petition under Section 25 of the Act as well) has to be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction (i) the marriage was solemnised, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together. or (iv) (not concerned in this case ). It is not disputed that the marriage of the parties was solemnised within the jurisdiction of District Court, Jullundur, both the parties are residing within the jurisdiction of District of Court, Jullundur, although it is not clear as to where they last resided together. Therefore, it is clear that even for a petition under Section 25 of the Act, the Jullundur Court will have jurisdiction in this matter. Adverting to the phraseology of S. 25, stress is being laid on the words "on application made to it for the purpose. " From these words it is sought to be inferred that 'it' is the Court, which passed the decree, and that court alone is this interpretation were to be placed on these words, it will lead to anomalous results as would be clear from the following example. Suppose, a divorce petition is dismissed by the first Court and the dismissal is confirmed by the High Court and the matter goes to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court grants a decree of divorce. The interpretation sought to be placed on S. 25 of the Act and on the word 'it', would mean that a petition for grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Act will have to be filed before the Supreme Court. Similarly, if the divorce petition was granted by this Court, the application for the grant of permanent alimony will lie to this Court. This is not the scope of either S. 25 or conveyed by S. 19 of the Act. Moreover, the opening part of S. 25 shows that the proceedings may be taken before 'any' Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act and the jurisdiction under this Act is exercised in view of Section 19 of the Act on matters arising under the Act. Therefore, the reasonable interpretation to be placed, would be that S. 25 or for the matter any other section, should be read subject to S. 19 so far as the jurisdiction of the Court is concerned unless there is a specific provision to the contrary in any particular section. Therefore, on a plain reading of S. 19 and reading it harmoniously with S. 25 of the Act, the only conclusion to be drawn would be that even if a petition for divorce, or any other decree, is granted by one of the Courts having jurisdiction under S. 19 of the Act, it may give cause to the opposite party to move for the grant of permanent alimony or any other relief under S. 26 or 27 of the Act, again the jurisdiction will be governed by S. 19 of the Act and not merely by the passing of a decree by a particular Court.