LAWS(P&H)-1982-6-3

JAI SINGH Vs. N A SUBRAMANIAM

Decided On June 02, 1982
JAI SINGH Appellant
V/S
N A SUBRAMANIAM Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment and orders of ours would dispose of L. P. As. Nos. 281, 282, 283 and 284 of 1977 as well as cross-objections No. 16 of 1978 filed on L. P. A. No. 281 of 1977 and cross-objections No. 15 of 1978 filed in L. P. A. No. 284 of 1977, as common questions of law and fact arise in these appeals and cross-objections.

(2.) IN order to appreciate the controversy, certain salient features of the case be noticed :-3. Colonel N. A. Subramaniam respondent along with Colonel J. S. Khurana and Major Y. Bisaria were going towards the Airport, Chandigarh, in a Military staff car driven by Sepoy-driver P. Mohammad on November 7, 1969, when the staff car met with an accident with a private car No. CH--1104, which was being driven by Sham Singh respondent and was owned by Jai Singh appellant, at the crossing of the roads between Sectors 23 and 24 and the Dakshan Marg. As a result of the accident, Colonel Subramaniam was thrown out and received injuries, so also the other occupants of the car including the driver. All the four injured person filed claim applications for compensation. The learned Tribunal vide its award dated July 11, 1973, awarded compensation of Rupees one lac to Colonel N. A. Subramaniam, Rs. 2,000/- to Colonel J. S. Khurana, Rs. 1,000/- to Major Y. Bisaria and Rs. 3,000/- to Sepoy P. Mohammad. 4. Dissatisfied with the award, Colonel N. A. Subramaniam filed an appeal in this Court, Similarly, Jai Singh, owner of the car and the General Insurance Company filed two appeals and one revision. All these appeals were heard together by the learned single Judge, who vide his judgment dated May 20, 1977, enhanced the compensation of Colonel N. A. Subramaniam from rupees one lac to rupees three lacs with interest at the rate 6 per cent, per annum from the date of claim application till its payment and dismissed the other appeals and revision filed by the owner of the car and the Insurance Company. 5. Aggrieved from the judgment of the learned single Judge, the appeals referred to above have been filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent 6. The appeals and the cross-objections came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. After hearing the arguments and on consideration of the entire matter, the Bench found that some substantial questions of law were involved in the appeals Consequently, after formulating the following questions, the appeals have been referred to Full Bench for decision. 1. Whether the claim of an injured person holding a pensionable post, for compensation on the ground of apprehended loss resulting from his inability (or handicap) to set up a private practice or secure other lucrative employment even after the retirement (apart from and addition to his admissible pension), is a mere speculative possibility or a reasonable probability, computable in terms of money ? 2. Whether a claimant's amendment application seeking an enhanced compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, after the period of limitation has expired, can be allowed at the appellate stage ?

(3.) IF the answer to question No. (2) is, in the affirmative, whether the respondent would ordinarily be entitled to adduce evidence and re-cross-examine the opposing witnesses afresh to avoid any prejudice on this score ? This is how we are seized of the matter. 7. The case was argued at great length before us and in view of the arguments advanced on either side by learned counsel I feel that it would be necessary to recast question No. 2 and 3, as before finding out the power of the Appellate Court to allow amendment in cases filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), it would be essential and necessary to find out the power of the Tribunal in this regard. Consequently, I propose to recast the above questions Nos. 2 and 3 into the following three questions :-2. Whether a Tribunal under the Act has power to allow amendment of a claims application after the expiry of the period of limitation ? 3. In case such a power is conceived in the Tribunal to allow amendment after the period of limitation has expired, will such a power not exist in the Appellate Court hearing appeals against the award passed by the Tribunal ?