ANU CHOPRA Vs. DIRECTORSPORTS DEPARTMENTCHANDIGARH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner who is daughter of a practising lawyer at Chandigarh and who indisputably originally belongs to village Nanewal Tehsil Balachaur, District Hoshiarpur, Punjab makes a grouse of the non-issuance of a gradation certificate by the Sports Department of the Punjab Government as per instructions No. 47/12/82-5 Edu(5)/2417 dated 20th May, 1982(Annexure R-1) making her eligible for admission to a Medical College in Punjab. The petitioner took the Pre-Medical Entrance Test (P. M. E. T.) held on 6th June, 1982 and secured 43% marks. It is the admitted position that as per the latest policy decision of the State Government a sportsman/sportswoman who secured 25% marks in this test is eligible to be considered for admission to this course against 2% reserved quota meant for them. In order to establish his/her status as sportsman/sportswoman, he or she has to secure a certificate known as 'Sports Gradation Certificate' under the instructions referred to above. The petitioner applied to the Director Sports, Punjab, for the issuance of this certificate to her on 12th July, 1982 on the basis of her achievements which are as under :-

(2.) Clause (9) of the instructions (Annexure R-1) around which the whole controversy revolves reads as follows :-

(3.) By now it is well had laid down that a law-making authority is not debarred from making reservations in favour of particular class of persons through executive instructions or orders provided that classification is based on reasonable criteria and has a nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. No classification can be held valid unless it is shown to bear a just and reasonable relation to the objects of a particular legislation before he Court. It is against beyond dispute that the guarantee of equality extends not only to statutes, rules and notifications but also to the executive orders. It is conceded that the primary object of making reservations in favour of sportsman/sportswomen for the purpose of admission to Medical Colleges is to provide then an opportunity to be admitted to those colleges even with a lower percentage of marks. This in all probability is for the reason that these sports people because of their activity in the field find lesser time for studies. If that be the object--as it is--then how and why the children of the Government employees only are entitled to such certificates is not explained anywhere. In other words, what is the nexus between the object of the instructions--providing for reservations in favour of sportsman/sportswomen--and the above-noted classification created from the class of sportsman/sportswomen. Why a sportsman/sportswomen whose parents are either in business, industry or n any other profession or trade other than Government service is not at par with the sportsman/sportswomen who is progeny of a Government servant is nor made clear by the respondents. To my mind, the classification created by the respondent-authorities is no classification at all in the real sense of the term as it is not based on any characteristics which are peculiar to the persons who as per clause (9) of the instructions are held to be entitled to that. The mere fact of a classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute or executive order from the reach of equality clause of Art. 14. Somewhat similar observation that "Art. 14 does nor forbid classification,, but the classification has to be justified on the basis of the nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved" has been made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. M. Sathakathulla v. Director of Medical Education, Madras, AIR 1968 SC. 1012, a case pertaining to admissions to a Medical College.