TIRATH RAM Vs. SMT. SUMITRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a tenant's Revision Petition against an order of variance passed by the Appellate Authority reversing the decision of the Rent Controller.

(2.) The facts briefly stated are that Sumitra Devi respondent-landlady filed a petition for the ejectment of the petitioner Tirath Ram from the demised premises which is second storey of Building No. 293/VII-2 situated in the area of Jaura Pippal, Amritsar, in which the petitioner is a tenant on a rental of Rs. 25/- per month on the basis of Rent Note, dated December 11, 1964. The respondent claimed eviction of the petitioner on two grounds, namely, default in payment of arrears of rent and bonafide requirement of the premises for her own use and occupation and that of her two married sons. The arrears of rent were tendered along with interest and costs on the first date of hearing before the Rent Controller and the ground of default was, therefore, set at naught. Though this ground still remained the subject-matter of dispute on which an issue was also framed, but for the purpose of this Revision Petition, the only point which has been mooted is as to whether the landlady had succeeded in proving the ground of personal necessity, or not. So far as the Rent Controller is concerned, he decided the matter in favour of the tenant and dismissed the ejectment application. The landlady, however, preferred an appeal which was accepted by the Appellate Authority, who ordered the eviction of the petitioner-tenant, though allowing him two months' time to vacate the premises.

(3.) The only point which has been urged on behalf of the petitioner in the present Revision Petition is the same which was pressed before the Rent Controller, namely, that the necessary ingredients for claiming eviction of a premises on the ground of personal necessity had not, been precisely alleged and proved. This matter has been duly considered by the Appellate Authority which has rightly held that the Rent Controller had not considered the material on the record in its true perspective. According to the Rent Controller, the responded landlady had married sons and both these sons should have also appeared in the witness-box to corroborate the testimony of their mother. This observation is not tenable. There is no specified number of witnesses who can prove a fact and there was hardly any reason to discard the disinterested and straight forward statement of the mother in this behalf. The Rent Controller further observed that the respondent admitted that a shop and a chobara were also owned by her in the area of Mastgarh and that she had not filed any ejectment application against the tenant of that premises. I fail to understand how the need for the occupation of the premises in dispute could be determined from the existence of some shop and a chobara above the same, which was not in the occupation of the landlady. A reference was also made to the ownership of the respondent to the extent of one-fourth share in some other house property at Amritsar, but there is no allegation that any such accommodation is under the occupation of the respondent. The mere fact that she owns some other property as a shareholder, would not stand in her way to seek ejectment of the premises in dispute. It would suffice to say that in the ejectment application itself, an averment was made by the respondent that she and her family members are not in occupation of any other residential accommodation in their own right, in the urban area of Amritsar, nor they had vacated any such building in such area after the commencement of the Rent Act. The respondent appearing as her own witness as AW 6 deposed to the same effect and there was no cross-examination worth the name on his point. In so far as the petitioner Tirath Ram is concerned he was obliged to admit in his cross-examination that he did not know whether the respondent had got any other residential accommodation at Amritsar apart from the house, where she was now living. In face of this material, the Appellate Authority was quite justified in ordering the eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal necessity of the respondent-landlady. No cause is made out in the present Revision Petition for reversing the finding of the Appellate Authority.