PUNJAB WAKE BOARD Vs. BANARSI DASS AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal has arisen out of a suit filed by the Punjab Wake Board for possession of the land measuring 1 kanal 9 marlas situate at Dasuya alleging that the same having been dedicated for religious and charitable purpose in the name of the Takia was the wakf property. As it had been acquired under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and later on transferred by the Punjab State to respondent No. 1, the suit was filed against both of them.

(2.) The defendant contested the suit and apart form denying the averments on merit took a preliminary objection that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit was barred by the provisions of section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (for short, the Act). The trial Court upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the suit. Having failed in the appeal also before the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, the plaintiff has come up in this second appeal.

(3.) The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the view of the two Courts below on the ground that though the Custodian has the exclusive jurisdiction to declare the property as an evacuee property but there is no provision in the Act which authorises him to determine whether such property is a wakf property or not. I quite appreciate the ingenuity of the learned counsel but the definition of the evacuee property makes it clear that the Custodian has the jurisdiction to determine whether the property is held as a trustee or as a beneficiary which necessarily means that he has the jurisdiction to determine as to whether the property is trust property or not. Section 11 which authorises the Custodian to manage the trust property also gives an indication to the same effect. Once it is held that the Custodian had the jurisdiction to go into the question and to determine whether the property is an evacuee property held in trust for religious and charitable purposes or not, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would obviously be barred by the provisions of section 46 of the Act.