MOHAN LAL Vs. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, REWARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, Gurgaon dated October 30, 1971, arises out of suit filed by the appellant for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent Municipal Committee from dispossessing him from the premises in dispute. As the plaintiff had been dispossessed before the grant of the ad-interim injunction the suit was converted into one for possession of the said premises.

(2.) The claim set up by the plaintiff was that he had been granted lease of the premises in dispute on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- in accordance with the resolution of Municipal Committee dated February 20, 1968 and the registered lease-deed was duly executed in his favour by its president and that he was entitled to continue in its possession as lessee till the lease was determined in accordance with law. The respondent opposed the claim and denied the existence of any valid lease in favour of the plaintiff. Though, no specific grounds were mentioned in the written statement as to why the lease was invalid but during the trial the objections raised were that the President was not competent to execute the lease-deed in view of the provisions of the Punjab Municipal (Executive Officers) Act (hereinafter called the Act) and that the common seal of the Committee had not been affixed on the said deed as required by Section 6(4) of the said Act. The trial Court found that there was no Executive Officer of the Municipal Committee at the relevant time but held that the lease-deed was invalid because of the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 6(4) of the Act. The lower appellate Court affirmed the judgement of the trial Court not only on the reason given above but also on the ground that there was no evidence on the record to show that no Executive Officer was in office on the date the lease-deed was executed. As regards the competency of the President to execute the lease-deed, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that no plea had been taken in the written statement in this respect and all that was stated was that no valid lease-deed had been executed in favour of the plaintiff. Even during the trail, the Municipal Committee led no evidence to show that any Executive Officer was in office when the lease-deed was executed. The contention of the learned counsel is well-merited. Before the trial Court, the respondent never disputed the fact that any Executive Officer was in office when the lease-deed was executed. The finding of the lower Appellate Court which has been recorded without taking into consideration the reasoning of the trial Court and the pleadings of the parties, therefore, cannot be sustained and is hereby reversed.

(3.) So far as the second ground is concerned, the requirement of putting a general seal of the Committee on the deed, in my view, is only of formal nature and the lease-deed which was duly registered cannot be vitiated for non-compliance of the same. I am fortified in my view form the provisions of Section 47 of the Punjab Municipal Act (hereinafter called the Punjab Act) which provide the mode of execution of contracts on behalf of the Municipal Committee where the Punjab Municipal (Executive Officer) Act is required under this Section is that the contract on behalf of the Committee has to be signed by two members of whom the President or Vice-President shall be one and counter-signed by the Secretary. Putting of the general seal of the Committee is, therefore, not required if the contract is to be executed under Section 47 of the Punjab Act. The only possible purpose of the requirement of putting the general seal under the said provision of Section 6(4) of the Act can be to show on the face of the document that it has been executed by some authorised agent of the municipal Committee. If the Legislature had intended to make this requirement a pre-requisite for the completion of written contract to which the Municipality is a party, a provision similar to the one under Section 6(4) of the Act would also have been made in Section 47 of the Punjab Act. I am, therefore, of the considered view that the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act are of a directory nature and the view of the two Courts below to the contrary cannot be sustained.