GULAB SINGH Vs. SUPERINTENDING CANAL OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of Civil Writ Nos. 5009, 5010 and 5519 of 1974. Identical orders of the Superintending Canal Officer dated 29.7.1974 are the subject matter of challenge therein. These can thus be disposed of by a common order.

(2.) The skeletal facts giving rise thereto are these. There were three watercourses which were feeding the irrigation needs of the petitioners. The Divisional Canal Officer proposed to amalgamate them into one watercourse. Accordingly, he prepared a scheme after observing due formalities. Finally, he confirmed the scheme whereby he provided one watercourse to the shareholders and amalgamated the three earlier ones. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioners filed appeals. The Superintending Canal Officer, as an interim measure, stayed the operation of the order of the Divisional Canal Officer taking into account the statement of the Ziledar which was to the effect that the erstwhile sources of irrigation were satisfactory and were to the extent of 90 per cent. He, however, put a rider on the stay order that the shareholders were required to subject the watercourse to brick lining. For that purpose, he required the Divisional Canal Officer to re-report to him by 15.2.1973. It seems that the lining was not completed and the date was extended till 31.1.1974. Then again, when the matter came up before him on 29.7.1974, he took the view that the orders passed by him have not been complied with and thus no course was left to him except to amalgamate the three watercourses. His decision in ultimate was to the following words :-

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioners has laid stress that the orders passed by the Superintending Canal Officer in the first instance were only interim in nature and that too not with definiteness as to what length of each watercourse was required to be brick-lined. He further submits that the petitioners had to the best of their intelligence brick-lined the watercourses, thinking that they had complied with the orders as the sole object for the purpose was to improve the irrigation. And yet if further lining had to be undertaken, at least the length of such lining had to be brought to their notice. It has further been contended that the petitioners had even applied to the Department that they be told about the length of the watercourses to be lined and even otherwise the Department should brick-line them at their cost which they were willing to share on being told the proportion, but to no avail. These facts, though relevant for the purposes of coming to a decision at the end of the Superintending Canal Officer, can have no bearing so far as the disposal of the present petitions are concerned. The other grouse that the impugned order is bereft of the reason as to maintenance of the order under appeal seems to be sound for it is plain that the water-lining aspect was only interim in nature, as the operation of the order appealed against had been stayed subject to the brick-lining. If the condition had not been satisfied, that did not absolve the Superintending Canal Officer to otherwise dispose of the appeal on merits. It is patent that he has upheld the decision of the Divisional Canal Officer for amalgamation of the three watercourses solely on the ground that his interim order had not been obeyed. The Superintending Canal Officer could not abandon his functions as an appellate officer to decide the case on merits. And in doing so, he had to keep in mind that considerable expense had been undertaken by the petitioners though according to him, partially towards lining of the watercourses. The impugned order has left them in lurch and that expense has gone down the drain with no advantage. Thus, it seems to me that the Superintending Canal Officer did not apply his mind, much less judicial mind, to the merits of the controversy. Necessarily, his order has to be set aside requiring him to reconsider the matter afresh.