SARMUKH SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Letters Patent Appeal seeks to impugn the judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 2168 of 1977. The facts giving rise to the same have been noticed in detail by the learned Single Judge and the same may be briefly, recapitulated. Ajaib Singh, predecessor-in-interest of respondent Nos. 7 and 8 owned 61 standard acres of land in the area of village Haveli, tehsil Nakodar and 3-1/2 standard acres separately in District Amritsar. The Special Collector declared his permissible area. Out of the remaining land at village Haveli, 11-3/4 standard acres were declared as the permissible area of Sarmukh Singh appellant as a tenant and the remaining land measuring 3-1 1/4 standard acres was found to be surplus and was declared as such. This land was allotted to Sohan Singh respondent and as evidenced by the document, Annexure R 6/1 the possession of this land was delivered to the said Sohan Singh on December 28, 1963. The matter regarding the said allotment was raked up by the appellant at various levels and ultimately the appeal filed by Sohan Singh before the Financial Commissioner against the order of the Commissioner Jullundur Division, was accepted and the case was remanded to the Naib Tehsildar Nakodar, to pass fresh orders after holding a thorough inquiry. The Naib Tehsildar upheld the allotment of land to Sohan Singh respondent and rejected claim of Sarmukh Singh appellant that he was a tenant on the land in dispute. The order of the Naib Tehsildar was reversed in appeal by the Collector, but on a second appeal the Commissioner restored the order of the Naib Tehsildar in favour of Sohan Singh respondent. The Revision Petition filed by the appellant against the order of the Commissioner in this behalf was also dismissed. A writ petition was thereafter filed by the appellant which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, and hence the present Letters Patent Appeal against the said order.

(2.) As is apparent from the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, the validity of the impugned orders passed by the Financial Commissioner and the Commissioner was challenged on two grounds. The first contention was that the land in dispute was a part of the appellant's permissible area as a tenant and could not, therefore, be declared surplus, and the second contention was that Sohan Singh respondent was not eligible for allotment of surplus area, as he had obtained similar allotment at another place. Both these contentions were overruled by the learned Single Judge.

(3.) It is material to note here that one of the points on which the learned Single Judge non-suited the appellant is, that the appellant was aware of the fact that on December 28, 1963, the possession of the disputed land had been formally delivered to Sohan Singh respondent and in spite of this fact, he did not care to challenge the siad order for a period of fourteen years. This laches on the part of the appellants was, therefore, held to disentitle him to relief under the extraordinary powers of this Court. The learned counsel for the appellant commenting upon this aspect of the matter, has merely urged that the document Annexure R6/1 had been obtained by means of fraud by Sohan Singh respondent by not disclosing that an earlier allotment had already been made in his favour. Apart from the fact that this plea was negatived by the Revenue Authorities who were seized of the matter, it is apparent that the plea of fraud is not available to the appellant as he is himself a signatory to the document Annexure R6/1 which is a copy of the Roznamcha Waquiati, pertaining to the land in dispute. The argument that this report was an illegal document and was, therefore, non est is also no avail in view of the circumstance that the appellant had signed the same in token of its correctness. Furthermore, the question as to whether the document has been created as a result of fraud is also within the domain of the Revenue Authorities who have given due consideration to the matter and it is not for this Court to consider the same either in a writ petition, much less in a Letters Patent Appeal.