LAWS(P&H)-1982-1-45

SHIV DAYAL Vs. KEWAL VERMA

Decided On January 21, 1982
SHIV DAYAL Appellant
V/S
Kewal Verma Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RESPONDENT Kewal Verma happens to be the tenant of Shiv Dayal, the Petitioner herein. Shri Shiv Dayal sought eviction of Shri Kewal Verma on grounds which squarely fall within the provisions of Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 Shri Kewal Verma, hereinafter referred to as the tenant contested the petition. The Rent Controller dismissed the same. When the appeal filed by Shri Shiv Dayal, hereinafter referred to as 'the landlord', came up before the Appellate Authority for hearing of arguments both the parties made statements in Court, so did their lawyers. As a result of the statements made by the parties, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Rent Controller and by order dated 5th December, 1975 ordered the eviction of the tenant, but directed that the order for eviction shah not be executed till 1st July, 1977.

(2.) WHEN the landlord sought to execute the order of eviction, the tenant filed, objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and challenged the maintainability of the execution application on two grounds (i) that the rent had been increased from Rs. (sic) to Rs. 150 with effect from 1st June, 1978 and in that manner a fresh tenancy had been created, and the tenant had spent a sum of Rs. 2,1155 from his pocket, on repairs of the house and that amount had not been completely paid off; (2) that the order of ejectment was not executable as the Appellate Authority had no where mentioned the ground of ejectment therein and Court had not satisfied itself about the same. The Executing Court found no merit in the first ground. However, it was of the view that the second ground was male out and it allowed the objections with the following observations:

(3.) A perusal of the observation extracted above of the Execution Court would reveal that since the Rent Controller had rejected the application of the landlord for eviction, it was considered necessary for the Appellate Authority to mention in the compromise order that there existed a ground of ejectment and that In its view such a ground had been prima fact made out and since this was not done, the compromise decree was a nullity.