(1.) THE meaningful question for the consideration of the Full Bench in this set of twelve regular second appeals has been formulated in the following terms in the order of reference:
(2.) AT the very outset it calls for pointed notice that the learned Counsel for the parties were agreed that for the limited purpose of the precise issue before us the distinction between a workman having the protection of Article 311 and another not so protected is one without a difference. It is the common case that the question admits of an answer which would have applicability to workmen irrespective of the aforesaid categorisation. Therefore, enlarging the scope of the question accordingly, we would reframe the question as under:
(3.) THE regular second appeal against the aforesaid judgments along with the other connected appeals, including those preferred by the State, first came up for hearing before my learned brother Sharma J. There it was firmly urged on behalf of the State that since the Plaintiff -Appellants were employed by the Roadways Department of the appropriate Government, their dismissal or removal from service brought into existence an industrial dispute which was governed exclusively by the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and therefore, was not within the cognizance of the Civil Court. Reliance for this contention was primarily placed on the Division Bench judgment in Banarsi Doss v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1980 (1) S.L.R. 355 and by way of analogy reference was made to State of Punjab v. Dawarka Dass, 1976 P.L.R. 92. In both the aforesaid cases, the workmen had not approached the State Government for making a reference under Section 10 of the Act, but nevertheless it was held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the matter was impliedly barred. Noticing some conflict of principle and judicial opinion and in view of the obvious importance of the issue, the same was referred for decision to the Full Bench.