(1.) Balwanta minor-respondent through his mother led an application under section 39 of the Guardians and Wards, Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for removing Shadi, his father, from guardianship and for withdrawing the permission granted by the Guardian Judge, Ambala, vide his orders dated October 30, 1980, for selling land measuring 80 Kanals. He also filed an application for an ad interim injunction restraining Shadi from alienating the said land pending the disposal of the said petition which was allowed by order dated April 11, 1981. It is this interim order which has been challenged by way of this revision petition.
(2.) The sole ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner to impugn the validity of the said order was that no petition under section 39 the Act was competent for revocation of the sanction, nor the Guardian Judge had the jurisdiction to do so.
(3.) So far as the jurisdiction is concerned, the matter is not res integra and as far back as in Sultan Singh v. Hashmat Ullah and others,1915 PunR 424 a Division Bench of the Chief Court of Lahore, held that if a Court had given sanction under sections 29 and 31 of the Act, it was not beyond the power of that Court to intervene and stop the sale if it found that something detrimental to the ward's interest was contemplated. It is not disputed that the provisions of section 29 are pari materia with the provisions of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. In another case, Rashmoni Dasi v. Ganada Sundari Dasi,26 IndCas 275, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dealing with such an argument, held that a Court was competent to recall an order obtained from it by suppression or misrepresentation of facts. Similarly, in Mule v. Mt. Dropadi,1952 AIR(MB) 93 and Walimu Khaton v. Md. Kabiruddin, 1958 AIR(Pat) 410 it was held that the order of appointment of a guardian could be withdrawn by the Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if it was found to have been procured by suppression of facts, misrepresentation or was otherwise detrimental to the interests of the minor. I have, therefore, no hesitation in repelling the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and holding that the Guardian Court had ample jurisdiction to revoke the sanction granted by it by virtue of its inherent powers. The second limb of the argument that no application is competent under section 39 of the Act is equally devoid of merit because the label of the application is hardly of any consequence, and the Court is fully competent to give relief under the proper provision of law. As the impugned order was not challenged on merits, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.