KANWAL SINGH Vs. HARDWARI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application arises out of election petition No. 1 of 1970. Kanwal Singh, Respondent, filed that petition for setting aside the election of Hardwari Lal Applicant. By my judgment and order, dated December 24, 1970, the election petition was allowed with costs and the election of Hardwari Lal was set aside. Civil Appeal No. 129 (NCE) of 1971, preferred by the Applicant against the judgment of this Court was allowed by the judgment and order of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, dated December 7, 1971. The relevant part of the formal order drawn in pursuance of the judgment of their Lordships reads as follows:

(2.) HARDWARI Lal, then made' the present application, dated December 9, 1971, for a direction to the Respondent to pay the costs incurred by the Applicant in contesting the election petition in this Court and for a further direction to the effect that the amount of such costs due to the Applicant may be paid out of the sum of Rs. 2,000 lying as security deposit on behalf of the Respondent (the election -Petitioner), and out of any unspent diet money deposited by him, and that a certificate for the balance of the amount of costs payable to the Petitioner may be granted. This prayer has been made and pressed before me on the ground that though no order as regards costs of the parties incurred in this Court has been passed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Applicant is entitled to recover from the Respondent the costs incurred by the Applicant on account of the mandatory requirements of the proviso to Section 119 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act).

(3.) ON the other hand Mr. H.S. Hooda, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, has submitted that the proviso to Section 119 applies to the same stage to which the purview of that section applies, i.e., the stage at which the High Court has to normally exercise its discretion in the matter of deciding the question of costs. The learned Counsel has argued that the stage for passing any order under Section 99 by this Court expired on December 24, 1970 and this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter after that day unless the Court is directed to exercise any particular function by the order of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. On that basis he has argued that under Section 121 of the Act it is only a party in whose favour costs have been awarded, who is permitted to apply for an order for payment of the amount of costs out of the security deposit or otherwise. He has further submitted that the judgment and order of this Court having been wiped out, the only operative order, which holds the field now is the above quoted portion of the formal order of the Supreme Court. Counsel submits that not making any order as to costs of this Court by the Supreme Court amounts to their Lordships saying that there shall be no order as to costs incurred by the parties in the High Court.