MEHAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The consolidation of holdings in village Phirni Majra was started in the year 1952-53. It is alleged that plot No. 145 was allotted to Mehar Singh and other petitioners and nobody objected against the allotment of this plot nor was this allotment challenged in revision or in appeal. Sometime in November or December, 1956, the petitioners got demarcation of this plot marked on the spot. Sometime in the year 1961, Gurditta and Labhu respondent Nos. 3 and 4 filed a petition under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, which was marked to the Consolidation Officer Flying Squad who recorded the statement of Gurditta and dismissed the petition. It was then urged in the petition that Gurditta and Labhu were able to get services of an influential person who was known to the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings. They filed another application under Sections 42 and 43-A of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This petition was marked by the Additional Director to the Consolidation of Holdings Flying Squad, (Sic) report. The main case was taken up by Additional Director on 30th of July, 1964, at Garhshankar. It is urged that because of the influence exercised by one Kathgarhia Sardar, the Additional Director decided this petition in favour of the respondents even though the petition was time barred and a second petition on the same cause of action was not competent. In support of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, reliance has been placed on Bhagat Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab and others,1966 ILR(P&H) 664, and Sewa Singh v. State of Punjab and others,1967 ILR(P&H) 89. The precise submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners based on these authorities is that the Additional Director should have called upon respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to explain the delay of each day caused by them in filing the revision petition. He has also submitted that in their petition, copy annexure 'B', it was admitted by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that they came to know of the demarcation on the spot in the year 1957, on which the son of one of the petitioners filed an application under Section 42 of the Act which was dismissed as incompetent, on 28th of March, 1964. The second ground urged is that the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, exercised quasi-judicial functions and in the absence of any special, provision enabling him to review his earlier orders, it was not open to him to entertain another petition on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on the same matter.

(2.) I have carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties and the documents produced by them. The impugned order Annexure 'E' shows that when the petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was marked to the Consolidation Officer for report the said Officer went to the spot and made measurements which reveal that a pacca kotha of the respondents Gurditta and Labhu in an area of 18 kanals which had been allotted by mistake to Mehru and Raju sons of Kirpa, Khushia and Siri Ram sons of Haku and Mangu and Labhu sons of Dula. The Director also accepted the explanation tendered on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and offered by their learned counsel that both of them continued living in that house. He also observed that kotha of the petitioners was not correctly plotted. After noticing the submissions made before him, the Additional Director rectified the mistake which was committed by the Consolidation authorities. It is no doubt true that when rival claims are pleaded in a revision petition before the Director, it would be incumbent upon him to expect the petitioner to explain the entire delay in filing the revision petition but when the consolidation proceedings have been conducted in a reckless and careless manner and the measurements made do not correspond to the situation existing on the spot, it would be the duty of the authority acting under Section 42 of the Act to act suo motu and to rectify the mistake committed by the Consolidation staff. The tenor of the judgment delivered by the Additional Director shows that built kothas cannot be allotted to other persons in consolidation. If that be so then the Director while passing the impugned order had actually advanced the interests of justice instead of committing any illegality. The mistake of this type can be corrected at any time whether the aggrieved party makes an application in this behalf or not. In my considered opinion, no exception can be had to the impugned order in consequence of the circumstances of this case.

(3.) The plea regarding the incompetency of a quasi-judicial officer to review his earlier order is akin to the plea of res judicata. When a party raises such a plea he has to file complete material alongwith the petition to establish that the authority concerned had taken decision on a similar matter on an earlier occasion. The learned counsel for the petitioners has neither filed a copy of the earlier order alleged to have been passed by the Additional Director nor has filed a copy of petition which respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are said to have filed before him. On the bare assertion made by the petitioners, it cannot be held that the matter in dispute had actually been raised by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and decided against them. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that they filed an application before the Additional Director praying that the earlier records should be summoned and the Additional Director committed an illegality in not summoning the earlier record. The order Annexure 'E' passed by the Additional Director shows that at the time of the arguments this matter was most probably not pressed before him. In this petition it has nowhere been alleged that the petitioners filed application for getting copies of the earlier petition filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and the orders passed by the authority under Section 42 of the Act thereupon, and all these documents were not supplied to them. In the absence of such a plea and on account of the omission on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioners appearing before the Additional Director and the other circumstances mentioned above, it is not possible for me to hold that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had actually filed a similar petition which was dismissed by the Additional Director. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the Additional Director while passing the order dated 8th of November, 1964, Annexure 'E' had reviewed his earlier order.