LACHMAN SINGH Vs. PUNJAB STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Shorn of unnecessary details, the relevant facts leading to the filing of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are that by his order dated November 12, 1969, the Divisional Forest Officer, Ropar, stopped the felling of trees by the petitioner to which he was entitled in pursuance of agreement dated October 29, 1969 (Annexure 'A/1') executed between the petitioner and respondent No. 3, in respect of 3500 acres of land under the management of the third respondent society for cutting specified sort of trees in that area in consideration of payment of auction money of Rs. 28,000/- by the petitioner and that the matter was ultimately settled between the petitioner, the Forest Authorities and the Government as a result of a meeting held in January, 1970, which culminated in the issuance of the letter dated January 19, 1970 (Annexure 'G') containing the terms of the decision of the Government. The society was also party to that decision. So far as the respondents are concerned, they do not attack the validity or legality on any part of the decision Annexure 'G'. The petitioner, however, claims that clause (iv) contained in that decision limiting the time during which trees could be felled by the petitioner up to February 28, 1971, was unauthorised, invalid and not binding on him as neither the petitioner was a party to that term being settled nor the Society had agreed to the same. Be that as it may, the petitioner did not complete the felling of trees by February 18, 1971, for various reasons with which I am not concernd in the present proceedings. On February 16, 1971, petitioner submitted an application for extension of time for felling the trees up to December 31, 1972 (Annexure 'I'). On June 4, 1971, the Government passed an order (Annexure 'J') extending the time for felling of trees by the petitioner up to December 31, 1971, except for the period commencing from April and ending with June, 1971. In accordance with the decision Annexure 'G' only such trees could be felled by the petitioner as had been marked by the Forest Department. In Annexure 'J' it was observed while granting extension that it was assumed that the marking of trees to be felled had been completed by the end of April, 1971. It was further observed that if this had not been done, the marking of the trees should be completed immediately. The order Annexure 'J' was communicated to the petitioner. He, however, submitted an application dated June 9, 1971 (Annexure 'K') to the Minister for extending the time for felling the trees up to December 31, 1972. According to the return of respondent No. 2, the Minister passed an order on that application on June 12, 1971, in the following words :-

(2.) The petition has been contested by the State (respondent No. 1) as well as by the Chief Conservator of Forests (respondent No. 2). The Society which had granted the lease of the forest in question (respondent No. 3) has filed its written statement dated November 3, 1971, admitting all the relevant facts stated by the petitioner. The Society has not contested the petition. The Gram Panchayat, Chhoti Bari Naggal, Tehsil Kharar, District Ropar, was impleaded as respondent No. 4 on its own application (C.M. 7743 of 1971) as it claimed to be interested in the land which was leased out to the petitioner by the Society. In para 9 of the State's return it has been admitted that the period during which felling was to be allowed by the decision Annexure 'G' has not been discussed in the meeting but the period was nevertheless specified in the order.

(3.) In the view I am taking of the first submission made by Mr. Awasthy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears to me that it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the controversy and to hear the parties on various other points which were sought to be urged by the petitioner. Mr. Awasthy's submission is that even if the impugned orders may be considered to be administrative and executive in nature and not quasi-judicial, the same were likely to, and did in fact, seriously affect the petitioner's civil rights and, therefore, those orders could not have been passed ex parte by the State Government without notice to the petitioner and without affording the petitioner adequate opportunity to show cause against the proposed orders. He had cited before the Motion Bench the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The D.F.O. South Kheri and Others v. Ram Sanehi Singh, 1970 1 SCWR 194. In that case, the contention was that the dispute having arisen out of the terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer having acted on authority vested in him under the terms of that contract, the remedy of the contractor was to institute an action in the civil Court and the writ petition was not maintainable. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the order had been passed by the Public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority which had deprived the contractor of a valuable right and it was source of the right which the contractor claimed was initially in a contract for obtaining relief against any arbitrary or unlawful action on the part of the public authority, he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of that decision of the Supreme Court no such contention as was raised before me in the instant case by the counsel for the respondents.