THE STATE Vs. MOTI RAM AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE are 55 appeals by the State directed against the orders of acquittal in respect of offences under Sub -clause (1) of Clause (a) of Sub -section (1) of Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act No. 37 of 1954), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. They involve a common point as to the interpretation of Section 20 of the Act and it will, therefore, be convenient to dispose of all of them in the course of this judgment.

(2.) IN each of these cases, the complaints under Sub -clause (i) of Clause (a) of Sub -section (1) of Section 16 of the Act had been filed by a Food Inspector for the local area concerned. It is not disputed that each of these Food Inpectors was authorised under Sub -section (1) of Section 20 of the Act by the State Government to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act. Each of these complaints, after giving a reference. to the notification of the Punjab Government whereby the Food Inspector was so authorised for the relevant local area, went on to give a brief recital of the facts, the nature of the adulteration and the substance of the offence committed and ended with the prayer that the accused be dealt with in accordance with law.

(3.) THE above case was discussed and explained by a learned Single Judge of the same Court in Municipal Health Officer and Food Inspector, Kozhikode v. Arthala Tea Estate Company, A.I.R. 1961 Ker 84. A complaint in this case Was laid by a Food Inspector, and all Food Inspectors had been generally authorised by the State Government of Kerala to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act. The learned Judge held that Sub -section (1) of Section 20 enabled general delegation of the power given to the State Government and local authorities, and the words "authorised in this behalf" meant the authority to institute or give consent to institute a prosecution for an offence under the Act, in other words, to exercise the power conferred on the State Government and local authorities. He further held that the use of the words "an offence" in the opening part of the section would not justify the interpretation that authorisation must be in respect of each particular offence; such a restrictive interpretation would defeat the very object of the section which was to enable the State Government and the local authority to appoint some other person to exercise on their behalf the discretion vested in them. If the State Government or the local authorities had to consider each particular case and determine whether a prosecution should be launched or not, there would be no point at all in conferring on them the power to delegate, and, moreover, the section would become altogether unworkable having regard to the large number of offences that are committed. Adverting to the former authority City Corporation of Trivandrum v. V.P.N. Arunachalam Reddiar and Anr., A.I.R. 1960 Ker 356, the learned Judge commented that the question whether the section permitted the State Government or a local authority to make a general delegation, did not arise for decision and was not decided in that case.