MHWAL ELECTRICALS INDIA LTD Vs. CHIEF COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Gosain, J. , dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by which an award of the industrial tribunal, Delhi, made on 26 February 1960 was sought to be quashed.

(2.) THE appellant, which is a company, carried on business inter alia of manufacturing electrical fans and had a factory in Subzi Mandi, Delhi. On 1 August 1959 when the Ministry in the State of Kerala was dismissed the workmen working in the factory of the appellant went on strike like other numerous workmen working in different industries in Delhi. Although all the other workers were permitted by the appellant to resume work, Sat Pal Sharma and other respondents were suspended from service. A charge sheet was later on served on them on 27 August 1959. The material part of the letter containing the charges is as follows:. . . you were guilty of misoonduot in so far as you were a party to a well-planned strike of the workers of the establishment on 1 August 1959 inasmuch as you yourself abstained from work and incited others to similarly abstain from work which was connected with your political activities and no connexion whatever with the dispute with the management or the conditions of service. The said conduct on your part amounts to a major misdemeanor within the meaning of Clause K of standing Order 13 of the standing orders inasmuch as the abstention from work was a breach of contract to carry on work regularly and resorted to during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before the conciliation officer, Delhi. These workers were required to appear before a three-man enquiry committee to answer the charges preferred against them. It appears that before the enquiry committee before whom the proceedings lasted from 31 August 1959 to 19 September 1959, 33 witnesses were examined on behalf of the management and 27 on behalf of the workers. On 19 October 1959 a report was made by the secretary saying that according to him the aforesaid respondents had incited other workers not to work on 1 August 1959 and this in his opinion amounted to a serious misconduct, particularly when the strike had nothing to do with any legitimate or other demands of the workers as such. He suggested their dismissal from 1 August 1959. On 12 October 1959 the orders of dismissal were conveyed by the management in the following words: In continuation of chargesheet dated 1 August 1959 you are informed that after considering your explanation dated 4 August 1959 and subsequent enquiry held by Sri R. P. Mehrotra, Sri M. L. Chawla and Sri D. R. Dhir, who were appointed by the management to enquire into the allegations made against you in the above chargesheet, the management have come to the conclusion that you were guilty of major misdemeanor inasmuch as on 1 August 1959, you along with others stopped work in the factory and incited other workmen to stay out from work and stopped them from entering the factory in a predetermined manner which was wholly unconnected with the conditions of service of the workmen or with any dispute between the workmen and the management. You are, therefore, hereby dismissed from service with effect from 1 August 1959. You are further advised to hand over the charge to your supervisor and report to accounts section to receive your dues, if any. An industrial dispute was, however, raised between the appellant and the workmen and this was referred to the industrial tribunal by the Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The tribunal gave an award on 26 February 1960 finding inter alia-

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the appellant has firstly raised the contention which is mentioned as point 2 in the judgment of the learned single Judge. Our attention has been invited to the definition of "strike" given in Section 2 (q) of the Industrial Disputes Act as also to the provisions in Chap. V dealing with strikes and lookouts. It is sought to be Shown that a strike of a political nature must be regarded to be per se illegal as it could never be contemplated that the strike with which the aforesaid provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act deal could be wholly unrelated to an Industrial dispute. Now, Section 23 of the Act provides for a general prohibition of strikes as defined in the Act but that prohibition is confined to Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that section but admittedly the strike for which the respondents in question were dismissed was not held during that pendency of the conciliation proceedings of other proceedings before a labour court or tribunal or daring the period of any such settlement or of the award. The strike is to be illegal by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 24 if it is confined to or declared in contravention of Sections 22 or 23 or if it is continued in contravention of an order made under Sub-section (3) of Section 10. Neither Section 22 nor Section 23 being applicable and there being no order under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 capable of being contravened, it could not be held that the strike for which the respondents were dismissed was an illegal strike. The learned Counsel for the appellant agrees that it could not be held to be illegal within the meaning of the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act but it is contended that it should be regarded to be illegal under what he calls general principles or rules of law inasmuch as a political strike is wholly outside the ambit and scope of the Industrial Disputes Act. All this attempt has been made by the learned Counsel for the purpose of bringing the case of the respondents concerned within the mischief of standing Order 13 (ii) (k) of the standing orders regulating the conditions of service in the appellant-company. According to the provisions contained therein, striking work or inciting others to strike work in contravention of the provisions of any law or rules having the force of law shall be considered as a major misdemeanour. The submission of the counsel for the appellant is that when the respondents concerned struck work for political reasons or incited others to strike work, they did so in contravention of the rules having the force of law.