THE MANAGEMENT OF THE POSTAL AND R.M.S. CO-OPERATIVE THRIFT AND CREDIT SOCIETY LTD. Vs. THE WORKMEN OF THE POSTAL AND R.M.S., CO-OPERATIVE THRIFT AND CREDIT SOCIETY LTD. AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE management of the Postal and R.M.S. Co -operative Thrift and Credit Society Ltd., has approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing or setting aside the award given by the Labour Court, Rohtak on 20th June, 1962 (Annexure 'A' to the petition), disposing of the reference made by the Punjab Government for adjudication of an industrial dispute between the Workmen and the management of the Petitioner -society.

(2.) IT is asserted that the workers interested in the dispute are also shareholders of the Petitioner -society. The principal question argued with great vehemence by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner relates to the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act to the dispute between the Petitioner Co -operative Society and its workmen, who, according to the Petitioner, are also its shareholders. It is not disputed that under the Punjab Co -operative Societies Act (Punjab Act No. XIV of 1955) a dispute like the present one was covered by Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and that a Division Bench of this Court has actually so held in The Jullundur Transport Co -operative Society v. The Punjab State, I.L.R. 1959 P&H 169 : : A.I.R. 1959 P&H 34. The correctness of that view has not been assailed at the bar. The contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner, however, is that under the present Act (The Punjab Co -operative Societies Act No. XXV of 1961) the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act is completely ruled out. This submission is based on the language of Sections 55 and 56 of the present Act. In my opinion, it is not at all necessary in the present case to decide this question because the present Act came into force on 20th October, 1961 whereas the reference which is sought to be taken out of the purview of the Act of 1955 had been made on 6th September, 1961. Shri Sarin has attempted to show the retrospective operation of the present Act by relying on Section 86 which is the repealing and saving provision and according to which notwithstanding the repeal of the Punjab Act No. XIV of 1955 anything done or any action taken under the repealed Act is, to the context of being consistent with the present Act, to be deemed to have been done or taken under it. It is argued that this section makes the whole of the present Act applicable to the pending references under the Industrial Disputes Act which were admittedly initiated prior to 20th October, 1961. I am wholly unimpressed by this submission. Section 55 on which alone reliance has been placed for excluding the adjudication of the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act so far as relevant for our purposes, reads as under:

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not submitted that the Labour Court constituted under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act is a Court within the contemplation of this section and, as at present advised, I think he has rightly refrained from making such a submission. A faint -hearted contention raised, however, is that if a Court is debarred from entertaining any suit or other proceeding in respect of a dispute mentioned in Section 55 then by necessary implication the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial" Disputes Act should be equally deemed to be debarred from entertaining any proceeding in compliance with the mandatory provision contained therein. The counsel has not been able to cite any principle or precedent in support of his contention, and as at present advised, I am not convinced of the cogency of this contention. But assuming, without holding, such an implied prohibition being implicit in this provision, obviously it would only bar entertainment of a proceeding. Now the word "entertain" may have both a wider and a narrower meaning, depending on the context in which it is used. It may in certain circumstances, which would in my humble opinion be very rare, mean "to receive on file" or "to keep on file", but commonly understood it would seem to me to mean "to admit to consideration" or "to receive for the purpose of adjudication". In Smithies v. National Association of Operative Plasterers and Ors. L.R., 1909 1 K.B. 310, the expression "an action...shall not be entertained" was construed by the Court of Appeal to apply to future cases and the contention that this expression was equivalent to "shall cease to be entertained" was rejected. Also see for this view Beadling and Ors. v. Goll (1922 -23), 39 T.L.R. 128, and Henshall v. Porter , L.R. 1923 2 K.B. 193.