(1.) This judgment will dispose of two appeals--E. F. A. No. 116 of 1950 and E. F. A. No. 55 of 1951. They arise out of execution proceedings, one in regard to a decree dated the 23rd July, 1937, for a sum of Rs. 7697/- and the other out of a decree dated the 6th August, 1937, for a sum of Rs. 2354/-. The last execution in both these decrees was taken out in August, 1948. An objection having been taken that the judgment-debtors were 'debtors' as defined in Section 7 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, it was held that the period of limitation for the execution of these decrees was reduced from 12 years as given in section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code to 6 years as provided for by the Punjab Debtors' Protection Act.
(2.) In appeal Mr. Hem Raj Mahajan has submitted in the first instance that as the Punjab Alienation of Land Act has been declared to be void under Article 13
(3.) The other question is whether the judg-ment-debter is a 'debtor' within the meaning of the word as used in the Relief of Indebtedness Act. In section 7 of that Act 'debtor' has been defined as a person who owes a debt, and in the proviso it is provided that a member of a tribe notified as agriculturist under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, shall be presumed to be a debtor in this section until it is proved that his income from other sources is greater than his income from agriculture. In this case the decree-holder has gone into the witness-box. He has stated nothing from which it could be shown that the income of the judgment-debtor from sources other than agriculture is greater than that he has from agriculture. (His Lord-ship considered the evidence and proceeded:) In any case there is no proof produced by the decree-holder showing that the income derived by the judgment-debtor from sources other than agriculture is more than the income from agriculture. Mr. Hem Raj Mahajan says the in these circumstances the judgment-debtor has no income from agriculture, but it is not shown that he has income from any other source. Therefore, it cannot be held that the decree-holder has discharged the onus which was placed upon him.