JANESHWAR DASS Vs. RAM DEV

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a tenant's revision application against an order of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, confirming in appeal an eviction order made by the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, in favour of the respondent landlord.

(2.) The premises in question consist of a shop and a godown described as plot No. 40, situated in Gerstion Bastion Road, Delhi. The applicant became tenant of the respondent landlord as long ago as 1943, and there is no dispute that the contract rent was Rs. 49/14/- per month. On the 5th of August, 1948, it appears, the landlord sent a notice to the applicant asserting that he was using the premises for residential purposes contrary to the terms of the lease upon which the landlord held the property from the Delhi Improvement Trust. The notice called upon the tenant to stop so using the premises. It appears that the tenant replied stating that the premises had been used for residential purposes with the consent of the landlord, and on the 15th of August the Advocate for the landlord sent a reply to this reply denying permission for use of the premises for residential purposes. On the 27th of August, 1948, a third notice was sent on behalf of the landlord in which it was stated that the use for residential purposes was not only contrary to the terms of the lease from the Delhi Improvement Trust but also was contrary to the purpose for which the premises had been let by the landlord to the present applicant. On the 27th of October, 1948, the suit was filed to eject the tenant and an amount of Rs. 49/14/- was claimed as rent, but admittedly this rent had fallen due after the last notice had been given. The grounds on which the landlord claimed the eviction were three. He alleged use of the premises for residential purposes contrary to the terms of the lease. He alleged use of the premises for residential purposes was contrary to the conditions imposed by the Delhi Improvement Trust in the original lease of the land, and thirdly he alleged nuisance on the part of the tenant. The trial Court appears to have held that letting purpose must be presumed to be for business and not residence, and, allowed eviction on two of the three grounds, namely of user contrary to letting purpose and user contrary to conditions of the lease granted by the Improvement Trust.

(3.) The judgment of the appellate court is largely taken up with recital of pleas and arguments. The learned Judge, however, rejected the statements appearing in the receipts given by the plaintiff's rent collector describing the premises as residential. The learned Judge considered that a statement in the written statement giving the time of the original lease as that from which residential usage was made to be proof that this usage continued up to the time of the written statement. The learned Judge seemed to think that the notice of the 5th of August was sufficient to give the plaintiff a cause of action under clause (b) (i) of section 9(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, but seemed to base his confirmation of the order of eviction on usage contrary to the conditions imposed by the Delhi Improvement Trust. I am unable to accept the argument upon which the trial Court based its finding that the letting purpose must be taken to be the purpose of business. Letting purpose is a fact which may or may not exist and when violation of letting purpose is relied upon by a landlord, the landlord must prove the purpose and the violation. It is a matter of ordinary experience that petty owners of property are often completely indifferent to the purpose to which their tenants may put the property. They are concerned only with the amount of rent they will receive. It is true that the promises consist of a shop, but that in itself is quite insufficient to prove that there was an express condition at the time of lease that the tenant would use the premises solely for the purpose of a shop and would on no account sleep there or allow any one else to sleep there. It is obvious that the plaintiff must fail on the ground contained in clause (b) (i) of section 9(1).