ISHAR SINGH Vs. THE STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a habeas corpus petition by Ishar Singh. His allegations are that he -was arrested by the police in connection with murder and dacoity cases and after he had been acquitted in one case and discharged in the other and while he was in judicial lock -up pending -trial of the third case, the District Magistrate made an order of his detention under Section 3, Preventive Detention Act. According to him the order was illegal inasmuch as it was made not with a view to preventing him from doing any thing prejudicial to public peace or order but for a collateral purpose. He also challenges the grounds of his detention and contends that he had done nothing wrong or unlawful.

(2.) MR . Chetan Dass who appears on behalf of the State opposes the petition and maintains that the order of detention was made after the District Magistrate had been satisfied in the terms of Section 3 end it was not vitiated by any kind of illegality. The first point stressed by the Petitioner's counsel before me is that since one of the three cases started against his client was still pending against him in Court, the District Magistrate had no power to make an order for his detention. Counsel's argument is that when a person is alleged to have committed an offence, Government must make up their mind whether he is to be prosecuted in Court or whether he is to be detained on the ground that it is necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order, and as in the present case a prosecution against the Petitioner had already been launched, Government should be taken to have exercised the option and in the circumstances they could not resort to the other alternative also. He refers me in this correction to a number of rulings. Most of these rulings were considered by me in - 'Giani Bachan Singh v. District Magistrate Sangrur' Cril. Misc. No. 62 of 1951 (A) wherein I held that whether detention of a person and prosecution started against him can be simultaneously made does not depend on any rule of law and the question is to be approached and answered in each case on the footing whether the order of detention in view of the pending prosecution is bona fide or not. After hearing the learned Counsel I still stick to my previous opinion and over -rule this objection.

(3.) AS regards the fourth ground it neither, mentions the date or time when the gang came into existence nor does it state whether the gang committed any dacoity or any other unlawful act. Of the three remaining acts attributed to the Petitioner which are specifically mentioned in the other grounds', two are fairly old: one was alleged to have taken place about two years before the date of detention order Why the District Magistrate took no notice on them earlier and why he considered it necessary to make an order of detention on the basis thereof shortly after the Petitioner had been acquitted in the murder case, has not been explained, nor has it been explained why haying waited so long the District Magistrate could not wait till the conclusion of the remaining two cases which were still pending against the Petitioner. It cannot even be urged that the Petitioner indulged in any kind of activity after his arrest in April 1951 for the simple reason that he has all along been detained in jail since then So whatever he did, he must have done so be fore he was arrested and if any action under the Detention Act was justified, it should have been taken either before he was arrested or shortly after that but instead of adopting this course what the District Magistrate did was that he waited for several months and ultimate ly decided to detain him after his acquittal in the murder case.