RAMESH BAJAJ Vs. AVTAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of impugned order dtd. 25/8/2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ferozepur (for short, the Tribunal), whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Sec. 151 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte award dtd. 4/2/2016, has been dismissed.

(2.) It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has wrongly passed the ex-parte award dtd. 4/2/2016. The petitioner was never served with any notice qua the pendency of the claim petition. The original owner had taken a plea that he had sold the offending vehicle to M/s K.K. Bhatha Firm, who was impleaded as respondent No.4 in the claim petition. However, the petitioner had already retired from the partnership, which was running the said brick kiln. After the year 1999, the petitioner had no concern with the said brick kiln. The counsel has also referred to the statement made by the claimant wherein he is shown to have stated before the Tribunal that it was one Sanjeev Kumar, who was the owner of the said brick kiln. One more document relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner is the information which was obtained by the claimants under the Right to Information Act and which does not show the petitioner to be the partner in the said partnership firm running the brick kiln. Relying upon these documents, the counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had no concern with the firm running the said brick kiln. Therefore, mere service upon the brick kiln or its employee cannot be taken as service upon the petitioner. It is also submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that even the Process Server has stated before the Tribunal that the notice was served upon one Sandeep Kumar; and that this fact shows that the petitioner was not actually served.

(3.) Having heard the counsel for the petitioner and having gone through the record, this Court does not find any substance in the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. It is not even disputed by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is one of the founding partners of the brick kiln in question. The registration and licence to run the said brick kiln was obtained by the petitioner himself. Although, the petitioner claims to have retired in the year 1999, however, the person who replaced him was none other than his wife. Therefore, merely because the petitioner retires as a partner would not severe the connection of the petitioner over the property of the brick kiln from the firm as such.