(1.) The landlord, who had lost in the Courts below, applying for eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement for personal occupation, is the revision petitioner before this Court. The landlord claimed the property through the original landlord Amir Kaur who had later transferred to Harbhajan Singh from he had purchased. The purchase was in the year 1989, but he claimed the arrears of rent from the year 1984. The Court relied on certain judgments of this Court that held that unless the arrears of rent were also assigned in the sale deed, a purchaser did not get automatically the right to seek for the arrears of rent prior to his purchase. There cannot be two opinions on the proposition advanced by the tenant which was accepted by the Courts below. I affirm the said finding.
(2.) As regards the contention of the landlord that he had become the purchaser of the property and that the respondent was the tenant, the Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had been proved. However, while examining the issue of bona fide requirement, the landlord's contention was not accepted. The landlord pleaded that he was himself in possession of rented premises in the same locality and his own landlord Amarjit Singh had required him to vacate the property. Dealing with this contention, the appellate Court relied on a judgment of this Court in Romesh Kumar v. Atma Devi-, 1986 1 RCR(Rent) 240 that held that a landlord, who was himself a tenant in some other property cannot obtain eviction on the ground of personal requirement without proving something more as to why he still required the property. The decision must be understood only as a ruling that a plea of personal requirement cannot be placed on the only ground that the landlord was himself a tenant elsewhere would dispel any requirement of having to prove the bona fides. It is perfectly legitimate that a statutory requirement of bona fide cannot be merely presumed. It has to be always brought through appropriate evidence and that the other building in the occupation of the landlord in the same notified town or village could be either as owner or tenant to disqualify him. It will be however stretching the logic a little too far if he must look for a landlord suing for eviction to be driven to the road by his own landlord before he can apply to the Rent Controller for eviction. All that is necessary is that there is an eminently genuine need for a landlord. The Rent Controller legislation that provides for protection to a tenant is invariably an option that he choose to exercise if he so wills. If a tenant is in occupation of a premise with a particular tenure of tenancy, on the completion of the period mentioned, there is no one particular mandate that the tenant shall not forfeit his tenancy. Beyond the period of tenure of tenancy where the rent control legislation is operative, he becomes a statutory tenant and to that extent, a tenant can demand that he shall not be evicted expect on the grounds stated in the petition. If in the tenant's perception the ground sought for by the landlord is established, he does not need to force a landlord to apply to the Court for eviction. This will mean casting an undue premium to a tenant's defiance. It is idle to believe that only if the landlord is forced to go to court he could establish his genuine need and the tenant must compel the landlord to resort to court proceedings. On the other hand, a tenant conforms to law and respects the same when he delivers possession of the property when he recognizes the landlord's need for the purpose which is not oblique but which is a ground available under the law.
(3.) The judgment of the Full Bench in Romesh Kumar is stated by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord as if to state that the landlord applying for eviction who is required to prove his bonafides must be actually vacated by his landlord through court before he could himself apply under this provision. This will lead to absurd consequences and give rise to deliberately false defences to be taken by a tenant. Yet another judgment cited by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant was Karnail Singh v. Vidya Devi wife of Gaggan Ram-, 1980 1 RCR(Rent) 592, which was in a situation where a landlord, who was himself a tenant was held entitled to eject a tenant only if the house occupied by the landlord is itself utterly unsuitable. It may be a matter of perception of how the landlord uses his own standard of living and what type of house he would try to move in, provided he fulfills the other parameters laid down under the law that he is himself not in occupation of any other building in the same notified town or village. The building in his occupation which is precarious and from which he is liable to be evicted cannot disentitle him to seek eviction. It will be straining the law to bring a new component for a landlord's requirement that the landlord, who is in occupation of another building as a tenant, must be a building which the landlord ought not to have vacated and he must have defied his own landlord to go to Court and needlessly lock himself up in litigation. In this case landlord's own landlord in respect of the premises in which he is in occupation of had given evidence as AW 3. He has spoken to the fact that he requires his own property and he wants his tenant, namely, the landlord in this petition, evicted. The evidence of AW 3 was sufficient to establish the bona fides of the landlord to secure eviction. The Courts below have adopted an artificial understanding to how the requirement of the landlord is to be established. Times without number the Courts have held that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement (see: Atma Singh Brar v. Mukhtiar Singh-, 2003 HRR 101; Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.-, 1998 2 RCR(Rent) 533; Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta-, 1999 2 RCR(Rent) 141.) The only circumspection that the Courts are bound to apply is to ensure that the landlord does not use this provision whimsically against a hapless tenant with an oblique motive to secure higher rental or arm twist the tenant to an unconscionable increase in rent. We have no such contentions in this case. The case has stood consideration of only on an issue of whether the landlord, who has been himself asked to vacate from his tenanted premises should have waited till his landlord filed a petition for eviction and forced him out of building. In my view, there is no such requirement and the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Romesh Kumar ought not to be understood in that fashion. The respective orders of the Courts below are set aside and the civil revision is allowed. Time for eviction 2 months.