(1.) The petitioner was a candidate for appointment to the post of Lambardar of Village Bhagatpur Hadbast No.93, Tehsil Batala, District Gurdaspur. The post of village Lambardar fell vacant on the death of Chan Singh, earlier Lambardar, on 30.1.2008. The process to appoint Lambardar was initiated. District Collector, after considering the candidature of various persons, appointed the petitioner as Lambardar. He is stated to be of a young age and M.A. B.Ed. Against this order, respondent No.4 filed an appeal before the Commissioner. Rather there were two appeals filed against this order. Both the appeals were heard by the Commissioner on 29.8.2012. The Commissioner has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the order passed by the Collector is perverse. As per the finding returned by the Commissioner, petitioner Bhupinder Singh is involved in a criminal case and proceedings to declare him as proclaimed offender are going on. He is also not having any land in the village as is recorded in the order. On this basis, the Commissioner found that the order passed by the Collector appointing the petitioner was perverse.
(2.) Counsel for the petitioner contends that while the petitioner was Sarpanch of the village, an application was filed against him relating to an incident dated 30.1.2004, for which he was summoned under Sections 452, 354, 506, 323, 34 IPC. The counsel has referred to order (Annexure P-6) whereby the petitioner was released on anticipatory bail in this complaint case. As per the petitioner, the complaint has now been withdrawn. Be that as it may, the fact remains that at the time of consideration, the criminal case was pending against the petitioner on the basis of a complaint filed by a lady making an allegation of molestation. It may have been wrongly construed as a case of rape, but the offence alleged against the petitioner would be involving moral turpitude. The view formed by the Commissioner on this basis to say that the order passed by the Collector was perverse cannot be faulted. No case for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction, therefore, is made out.