KHAIRATI LAL Vs. BANSI DHAR ACHARYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The civil revision is at the instance of the tenant, who has been ordered to be evicted by the order of the Appellate Authority. The decision of the Appellate Authority was in reversal of the order of dismissal of the petition of the landlord for eviction. The eviction had been sought on the ground that the tenant had altered the construction by removal of three pillars and erecting a beam to support the roof without the concurrence of the landlord. The action of the tenant constituted a material alteration to reduce the value and utility of the building and therefore, was liable to be evicted.

(2.) The contest by the tenant was on the ground that the petitioner-landlord was one of the Acharyas-Pujaris of the temple, who owned the property. All the Acharyas had been actually impleaded as co-respondents No.2 to 11 before the Rent Controller. One of the Acharyas, who had filed the petition namely Bansi Dhar, produced rent receipts to show that the relationship as the landlord and tenant existed only between him and the tenant and the tenant could not have sought for any alteration of the building from any person other than the petitioner. Consequently, the purported act of the tenant in securing some alteration of the building through the Trustees of the temple was unauthorized. The tenant contended in defence that there had been a petition by the Trustees against the Acharyas-Pujaris for management of the Trust and for accounting. The Trustees were claiming that a Trust deed had been executed in the year 1969 and since the property vested in the Trust, the alterations made by the Trustees cannot be attributed as alterations by the tenant himself. It came through in evidence that the petition filed by the Trustees was dismissed on a technical reason that Trust deed had been made subsequent to the filing of the petition and therefore, the petition itself was not maintainable. The Rent Controller found that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Acharya and the tenant had been established but however, the existence of a Trust deed showed that the property vested in Trust and the alterations made by the Trust could not constitute an actionable wrong of the tenant. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. In appeal, the Acharya contended that he had given evidence to the effect that the property was taken by the tenant only from him and his evidence to that effect was not even cross-examined by the tenant. The issue of ownership itself was irrelevant for consideration of whether there could have been a lawful authority for the tenant to bring about alterations in the building through the Trustees. The Trust deed relied on by the tenant itself showed that the Trustees could carry out repairs in respect of the entire Trust property except the temple and the four shops. Clause 10 of the Trust deed-R-39 was to the effect that the Trust was in respect of the entire property excluding the temple and they could be given on rent and rent so collected shall be used for furthering the objectives of the Trust. The trustees shall be entitled also to rent out the four shops referred to and the rents receipts shall be used for the furtherance of the objective of the Trust. Relying on Clause 11, which had allowed for alterations or repairs only in respect of property except the temple and the shops, the fact that the repairs had been brought about by the Trust itself was against the terms thereof and any alteration or repair that constituted an actionable ground must be seen only from the landlord's perspective. Since the landlord namely the Acharya had found the alterations made to constitute a material impairment, it would not avail to a tenant to contend that the alterations and repairs made by the Trust could give him any right of defence against eviction. The appeal by the Acharya was, therefore, allowed.

(3.) It was very clear from the rent receipts filed before the Court that the rent was being paid by the tenant only to the Acharya. It may not also be possible to examine whether any person other than the Acharya could be said to be the landlord. The issue of ownership is irrelevant and I have no problem in accepting the contention of learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that a landlordtenant relationship has no bearing to the issue of ownership itself as laid down by the Supreme Court in E. Parashuraman (D) by LRs Vs. V. Doraiswamy (D) by LR, 2005 2 RCR(Civ) 590. A Full Bench of this Court had also dealt with the issue in the context of an allottee from the Housing Board could just as well be a landlord if he had created a lease in favour of the third party, to bring home the point that even an allottee, who had taken the property from the Housing Board to which installments were due before the allottee could have become the owner of the property, could still maintain an action for ejectment against a tenant inducted by him. I hold as considered by both the Courts below that the Acharya was the landlord for the tenant.