RAM KUMAR Vs. RAM PAUL LUTHRA AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The revision petition is at the instance of the landlord seeking for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The building was said to be at the ground floor with the first floor and the second floor retained by the landlord. The landlord's requirement was that his own family of his mother and two children was growing in size and that he had the necessity for securing eviction of the tenant in occupation of a shop for accommodating the family needs.

(2.) While normally under the scheme of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, the requirement for eviction for residential purpose shall be only in respect of residential building, the case has to be considered from the context of what the building was and what the predominant use of such a building was. According to the landlord, the entire building was a residential accommodation with the ground and two floors but a portion of the building at the ground floor was used for non-residential purpose. This, according to him, by itself would not constitute the building to be a non-residential building. It is an admitted case that there is no particular zoning requirement which would itself dictate the nature of use that the particular building could be put to. Consequently, if it is seen that the building was used for residential purpose predominantly and a portion of which it was an integral part of the remaining building was put to non-residential purpose, it cannot lose the residential character. Many a poor Indian reside on the pavements of roads or in the railway station, but it cannot mean that a road pavement or a railway station is a residential accommodation. This idea is only to see logically that it is not always the manner of user that determines what the property is; it is an incidental issue. In this case, the predominant nature of the building was residential but the property let out was for a non-residential purpose. If the landlord was, therefore, asking for eviction for his own residential need and had a grievance that the remaining property, which was in occupation of the tenant was depriving him of his residential needs, there cannot be any objection for the maintainability of the petition itself. This issue has been considered by this Court in Rajinder Kumar Versus Niranjan Lal and another, 2006 4 RCR(Civ) 840 where the Court held that in a room in a residential building which was let out as a shop could not be termed to be the commercial building and the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant from the said room for the bona fide requirement for residence. The same point has been reaffirmed by a still later judgment in S.Narinder Singh and another and Versus Manohar Singh and others, 2011 3 RCR(Civ) 396. The Supreme Court was considering this issue in Rakesh Vij Versus Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi and others, 2005 AIR(SC) 3593, where a shop which was in the ground floor was sought to be evicted by the landlord who was using the first floor of the same building as a residential building. The Supreme Court held that a landlord was entitled to seek eviction of the tenant from such a non-residential building for his own residential need. The Court was relying on its own judgment in Harbilas Rai Bansal Versus State of Punjab, 1996 1 SCC 1. The latter judgment was actually a judgment that held an amendment excluding non-residential building for personal requirement as arbitrary. The said judgment itself did not provide for the requirement of the landlord for eviction of a portion of the building which was put to non-residential purpose, if the landlord was requiring it for a residential purpose. It is the extension of principle in Harbilas Rai Bansal's case that made possible for the Supreme Court in Rakesh Vij to hold that eviction of a shop which was evidently non-residential could still be sought by a landlord occupying another portion of the same building which was for a residential purpose. This, in my view, holds the key for understanding whether a landlord could seek eviction for a residential purpose, a property held by a tenant which was nonresidential. It is possible only in the situation where the landlord seeking for ejectment is himself in occupation of a remaining portion of the building which was for a residential purpose that would help to determine the nature of the building itself as residential building. I would, therefore, vacate the finding rendered by the appellate Court that the petition itself would not be maintainable.

(3.) The reasoning of the appellate Court that since the mother died, one room has fallen vacant and, therefore, an issue that a room that has fallen vacant must be taken as compensating a room which is occupied by the tenant makes a mockery of how the family members live in the house. A house is not assigned by room to each member. The whole house is enjoyed in every inch by every member. A member that died does not vacate the room, the person vacates the house. The requirement of the family must still be seen in the context of the size of the family. In this case, if the landlord was contending that he had only two rooms in his occupation and he had children who were growing, it was fair enough that he required the property which was in the hands of the tenant for his personal need and that there ought not to be a ground for suspicion that the landlord was greedy to secure his own property. At the time when the petition was filed about 25 years back, the son and the daughter were children. They must have been grown up after two decades and that would even require an additional room for their own privacy. The rejection of the claim for ejectment by the appellate authority in reversal of the decision of the trial Court is erroneous. I set aside the order of the appellate authority and direct eviction of the tenant.