(1.) The petitioner, who was working as a Special Police Officer (SPO) under the Punjab Police was enrolled as a Constable on 02.02.1992. He was involved in a criminal case under Sections 326, 325, 324, 323, 148, 149 IPC and was convicted and sentenced to RI for 6 months under Section 148 IPC and RI for 1 year under Section 326 IPC and a fine of Rs.500/-. He was also sentenced for 6 months under Sections 325/149 IPC, 6 months under Section 324 IPC and RI for 3 months under Sections 323/149 IPC. All the sentences were to run concurrently. It is not a matter of dispute that the petitioner had challenged his conviction and sentences in terms of filing the appeal in this Court but the same was dismissed and the conviction and sentence were upheld in terms of the judgment dated 30.01.2009 (Annexure P- 1). The petitioner had been served a show cause notice on account of his conviction and in pursuance thereto, had been dismissed from service vide order dated 07.10.2002 (Annexure P-2). The statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the Appellate Authority in terms of the order dated 20.05.2003. Apparently, the petitioner even preferred a revision petition which had been dismissed vide order dated 02.06.2010 (Annexure P-6). The petitioner, thereafter, is stated to have filed a mercy petition before the Director General of Police, which also stands rejected in terms of order dated 04.06.2011 (Annexure P-8).
(2.) The present writ petition has been filed impugning the order dated 07.10.2002 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Punishing Authority as also the order dated 20.05.2003 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Appellate Authority, order dated 02.06.2010 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Revisional Authority and order dated 04.06.2011 (Annexure P- 8) passed by the Director General of Police rejecting the mercy petition filed by the petitioner.
(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently argue that the extreme penalty of dismissal that had been imposed upon the petitioner is wholly un-warranted inasmuch as the Competent Authority did not consider the conduct of the petitioner as also the gravity of the misconduct committed by him which had led to his conviction. Counsel would submit that since no departmental proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner and the impugned order of dismissal was passed solely on the order of conviction, it was obligatory for the Competent/Punishing-Authority to have applied its mind to the matter so as to return a finding as to whether the conduct of the petitioner would fall within the expression "Moral Turpitude." Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length, I find that the present writ petition merits dismissal.