MANJIT KAUR Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) TEJINDER SINGH DHINDSA.J Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length. Challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 11.7.2012 (Annexure P-5) passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab, whereby the appeal preferred under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 filed by the present petitioner against the order dated 7.10.2008 passed by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Jallandhar has been dismissed having been held to be barred by limitation.

(2.) BRIEF facts of the case are that the petitioner is the widow and legal heir of late Sh. Jaspal Singh, who had been granted one regular Stage Carriage Mini Bus Permit No.401/Mini/ASR with four return trips daily on Rayya to Khadoor Sahib via Jallalabad route. Such permit was valid up to 29.11.2005. The husband of the petitioner had submitted an application for renewal of the permit which had been received in the office of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Jallandhar on 20.12.2005. Such application was rejected by respondent no.2 on 7.10.2008. Husband of the petitioner expired on 18.10.2008. The present petitioner being the widow/legal heir preferred an appeal under Section 89 sub clause (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the order dated 7.10.2008 on 22.4.2010. A stand was taken that the petitioner had become aware of the order dated 7.10.2008 on 26.3.2010. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab vide impugned order dated 11.7.2011 has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner dated 22.4.2010 holding the same to be barred by limitation.

(3.) ON the strength of Rule 85 of the Rules, learned counsel would contend that the remedy by way of an appeal against an order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to a person aggrieved of any such order is within a period of 30 days from the date of "receipt of the order". The precise submission raised on behalf of the petitioner, accordingly, is that the period of limitation would commence not from the date of knowledge of the order or from the date of the order itself but from the date of receipt of the order as has been stipulated in clear and unambiguous terms in the statutory provisions.