RAVINDER SOOD Vs. MOHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The landlord's petition for personal necessity filed under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was dismissed before the Rent Controller. In appeal by the landlord, there was reversal of fortune for him when the appeal was allowed. The defeated tenant, who faced an order of ejectment, is before this Court in revision. The landlord's contention relating to his bona fide personal necessity was founded on a plea that the property in the hands of the tenant namely the building in House No. 43 was the only residential house, which he had and the other property in which he was actually in possession of, namely, the property in building No. 53 was inadequate to the size of his family consisting of his wife, three grown up sons with the respective wives, daughters and the grand children. The landlord rested his case on a plea that there was only one kitchen and a room at the first floor and the rest of the portions were in the occupation of his brothers. The landlord would contend that he had to take yet another property on rent in door No. 66 at Mohalla 14 only on account of inadequacy of the premises, which he was in occupation of for accommodating of the members of his family in reasonable comfort. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant would contest every one of these submissions and would point out to the wrong assumptions made by the Appellate Court with reference to the property occupied by him and the failure of the Appellate Court to take note of the availability of other buildings through ownership of his wife and son. This, according to him, was particularly relevant since the landlord was seeking for ejectment on the ground that the property was insufficient for accommodating all his sons with the respective families of spouses and children, besides his own wife, who according to the landlord was inconvenienced in her old age of having to climb up stairs. The learned counsel would contend that the entire building in door No. 53 was a three storeyed building and apart from the fact that the application filed by the landlord showed not merely a room and a kitchen but additional room at the first floor, the whole of the remaining property was also in the hands of the landlord himself. The counsel would urge that the landlord had been fighting an independent litigation with his brothers and the decree copy filed before the Court would show that the property in door No. 53 where he was in occupation was itself not a subject of litigation at all and family was admittedly litigating for joint properties that the family owned. No portion of the property in House No. 53 was ever claimed by any one of the brothers and his own statement that apart from his occupation of the 1st floor, the remaining properties of the ground floor and the 2nd floor were in the possession of the brothers and their families could not, therefore, be correct. It is also the contention of the counsel for the tenant that the ownership and occupation of the other buildings that the spouse and the son owned was also relevant when the landlord's bona fide requirement was sought on the ground of requirement of not only of himself but also of the requirement of his son and for his wife.

(2.) I cannot find any particular virtue in argument that in the suit filed for partition between the landlord and his brothers, the property in door No. 53 was not subject of litigation. In what capacity the landlord was actually in occupation of door No. 53 is not very clearly known either from the pleadings or from the evidence. I am prepared to assume that the property in door No. 53 itself was not a property that belonged to the family of the landlord and his brothers and hence was excluded from the partition action. This may not by itself disprove that his brothers could not be in possession of any other portion of door No. 53. Ownership and possession may not at all times be necessary to reside in the same portion. The case will have to be still seen from the evidence available whether the landlord's bona fides have been established by the alleged inadequacy of the building.

(3.) All that the landlord requiring an ejectment of residential building could be required to show in his pleading is that he is not occupying "any residential building" in the urban areas concerned and he has not vacated said building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act besides showing that the building is required for his own occupation. The consideration of whether the landlord is occupying another residential building is seen from the context of whether such another building is sufficient for his own requirement. A mere possession of another building may not disentitle a landlord to seek for ejectment for his bona fide requirement. The typical example could be that yet another building, which is available may be inadequate. In this case that is precisely the point which is sought to be made that the building which he was in occupation of at door No. 53 was not sufficient and that he had in possession only one room and a kitchen. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, rough sketch filed by the landlord himself proves that at the first floor apart from a room adjoining the kitchen, there is yet another room adjoining the stair case. If we must contend with the fact that the family consisting about 9 or 10 persons could not be accommodated in two rooms, then it would require to be shown that the property in the ground floor and the second floor were not in his occupation but they were in occupation of his brothers. That his brothers were in occupation of the remaining portion of the building was brought for the first time only in evidence and that was not even set out in the pleading. I am prepared to assume that strict rules of pleading may not be applied in rent control proceedings but if the bona fides of a requirement were to be established particularly in the context of the building which he was in occupation of was not sufficient by him, the ground for such insufficiency must be in some way surely established. It cannot merely be a matter of evidence. In this case even the evidence given by the witness is not very clear. He does not say anywhere who is residing in the other portion of the house in door No. 53.