S. MANOHAR SINGH Vs. S. ARIDAMAN SINGH DHILLON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a tenant's revision petition against the order whereby the learned Rent Controller dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for leave to defend in a petition under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') filed by the respondent-landlord.

(2.) THE respondent-landlord filed an application under Section 13-A of the Act to seek ejectment of the tenant, inter-alia, on the ground that he is retiring Government servant on 31.7.1998 and, therefore, the tenant was served with the summons contemplated under the provisions of Section 18-A of the Act on 19.9.98 accompanied by the copy of the petition. However, the tenant moved the application for leave to defend on 24.12.1998 and also an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay because on 19.9.1998 when the summons were received by him, he was to visit to foreign country. It was stated that by him that he reached back Amritsar on 24.12.1998 and immediately thereafter he moved the application for leave to defend alongwith application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, 1995(2) RCR (Rent) 323 (SC) : AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2272 to contend that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act which is a local law has not been specifically excluded from the applicability of the Limitation Act in terms of provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said provision contemplates that where any special or local law prescribes for a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court affirmed minority view of Full Bench in Jokkim Fernandez case (supra). Learned counsel further pointed out that the said judgment of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench, therefore, the Division Bench does not lay down correct law. In fact, the said judgment is per incuriam.