(1.) The petitioners were recruited as Special Police Officers in the year 1994. On June 26, 1998, a case was registered against the petitioners. It was alleged that they had committed offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On June 29, 1998 the Superintendent of Police ordered the termination of services of the petitioners. Aggrieved by the orders of termination, the petitioners have approached this Court through the present writ petition. They pray that the four orders which have been produced as Annexures P/3 to P/6 be quashed. It is alleged that the petitioners were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated March 276, 1999. Therefore, the petitioners had served a legal notice dated April 23, 1999 on the respondents. Nothing having been done, they were constrained to approach this Court. In these premises, the petitioners pray that the orders regarding the termination of their services be quashed.
(2.) A written statement has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It has been inter alia pointed out that the petitioners had been appointed on daily wages. Their services could be terminated at any time without giving any notice. The petitioners had raped a girl. The matter was considered. It was felt that the petitioners were not likely to make good police officers. The petitioners "being daily wagers have rightly been discharged in accordance with rules and regulations governing the service....." On these premises, the respondents maintain that the writ petition be dismissed.
(3.) Mr. Kanwal, learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that appointment of Special Police Officers is made under Section 17 of the Police Act, 1861. The powers of the Special Police Officers have been laid down in Section 18. They have all the powers and privileges available to a police officer. Thus, they have the protection of Articles 311 of the Constitution. Since, no notice or opportunity was given, the action of the authority in terminating their service is vitiated. On the other hand, Mr. D.V. Sharma has contended that the petitioners have been simply discharged from service. They have filed a wrong translation of the original orders as they have not been dismissed from service. Consequently, no opportunity was required to be given.