OM PARKASH BABBAR Vs. HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to the "Code") for quashing of an FIR registered under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 39-A of the Electricity Act filed by the petitioner Om Parkash Babbar was originally heard by a Learned Single Judge of this Court. The FIR in question was sought to be quashed by the petitioner on the ground that a penalty has been imposed and realised from the petitioner by the Electricity Board and, thereafter, subsequently there was no justification to proceed with the FIR. Before the learned Single Judge reliance was placed upon a Single Bench judgment of this court in Shashi Chaudhary v. State of Haryana, 1998(3) RCR(Crl.) 775 (P&H) : 1998(3) Chandigarh Criminal Cases (HC) 151. The learned Single Judge expressed his dis-agreement with the view taken in Shashi Chaudhary's case (supra) by observing that the proceedings for recovery of the penalty are quite different from a criminal liability and a criminal liability could not be wiped out by issuing a circular imposing some penalty for consumption of electricity unauthorisedly. After making the aforesaid observations, the learned Single Judge referred the matter to a larger Bench. that is how the present petition has been placed before us.

(2.) CERTAIN facts may be noticed :

(3.) THE petitioner has approached this court through the present petition for quashing of the aforesaid FIR No. 231 dated May 14, 1997 and the police report (challan) submitted in consequence thereof. The main ground on which the quashing of the aforesaid FIR and the police report has been sought is that there was a policy of the Board to the effect that once a penalty was imposed on the consumer with regard to the theft of the electricity, then the aforesaid FIR was to be withdrawn and connection restored. The petitioner has asserted that since he had duly deposited the compensation as assessed by the Board, therefore, after the aforesaid deposit neither the FIR could be sustained nor the criminal proceedings against him could be continued any further. It is also submitted that the continuation of the criminal trial against the petitioner amounted to double punishment and was a sheer abuse of the process of the Court.