D D MALIK Vs. S M NEHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE order of Rent Controller, Chandigarh, dated 18th September, 1990, impuged herein not only appears to be unusual but illegal also. However, it purports to have been passed in the light of the Supreme Court order dated 11th January, 1990, in Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1990 arising out of S. L. P. (C) No. 236 of 1990. The following undisputed facts furnish the necessary backdrop of the case.

(2.) THE petitioner, as a specified landlord, filed an application under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applicable to Chandigarh, and hereinafter referred to as the 'act', to seek eviction of the respondent on the ground that the accommodation in his possession in the local area was not suitable. He duly supported it with his affidavit. The controvert this stand of his, the respondent-tenant filed an affidavit in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 18-A of he Act, requesting leave of the Court to contest the said application. The same was, however, refused by the Court vide its order dated 26th August, 1988. Respondent's revision petition against this order was again dismissed by this Court on 20th December, 1989 He preferred a Special Leave Petition, referred to above, which was allowed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following terms :

(3.) THE me of the word 'summary Procedure* in the above-quoted order of the Supreme Court on which the learned counsel for the respondent has heavily relied to sustain the opinion of the Rent Controller, to my mind, only indicates or refers to that procedure which has to be followed when no permission to contest is granted to a tenant under sub section (4) of Section 18-A of the Act I am of the view that this section lays down two wholly independent procedures to govern two situations : (i) when leave to contest is refused to a tenant and (ii) when such leave is granted. The procedure prescribed in sub-section (4) governs the first situation and the one specified in sub-section (6) apples to the latter. This is so very manifest from a close reading of these two subsections. Therefore, what the above noted order of the Supreme Court ruled out was the procedure prescribed in sub-section (4) of this Section which obviously is a summary procedure as compared to the one laid down in sub-section (6 ). With the grant of leave to the respondent, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Rent Controller has essentially to follow the procedure prescribed in sub-section (6) of this Section As a matter of fact, two judgments of this Court have, by now, assigned the same meaning and content to the above noted order of the Supreme Court and the judgments are Ravinder Nath v. T. R. Lakhanpal, (1990-2) 98 P. L. R. 140 and K. G. P. Pillai v. Subash Chander Pathanias. (1990-2) P. L. R. 574.