PRITAM Vs. MURTI MARI GUGGA PIR MANDIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision is directed against the order dated 19/02/1990, of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Jagadhri.

(2.) FACTS relevant for the decision of the revision petition may be briefly stated as under : Murti Mari Guga Pir Mandir instituted a suit for permanent injunction through Lal Chand Mohtamim restraining the defendants Shri Badir and others from interfering in the actual and physical possession of the plaintiffs property, comprising temple of the Murti in Khasra No. 181 min (1 Kanal 19 Marlas) is the area of Chhachhrauli, in any manner whatsoever. The suit was instituted on 19/11/1985. The written statement was filed on 7/01/1986 and issues were framed on 28/02/1986. During the pendency of the suit, both the parties made an application to the Court on 22/04/1989, that the dispute may be referred to the arbitrators and that their decision would be final and binding on both the parties. Two arbitrators were named by the plaintiffs and an equal number by the defendants. The decision of the majority was to be the final decision of the arbitrators. The plaintiff named S/Shri Mohan Lal and Faqir Chand as the arbitrators, while the defendants named S/Shri Ved Parkash and Brij Mohan. Both the arbitrators named by the plaintiff made an application to the Court refusing to act as arbitrators. Their statements were recorded by the Court and the following short order was passed: "Defendants file reply to the application Case is adjourned for plaintiff's evidence to 1-6-1990 and argument on application for disobedience." Defendant No. 4 Pritam Chand has filed this revision against the said order.

(3.) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that there was no illegality committed by the Court and, therefore, there was no case for interference in revision. THEre is no force in this contention. THE learned trial Court has clearly fallen into a grave error in fixing the case for plaintiff's evidence without passing the requisite order superseding the arbitration as also without giving any indication whatsoever that it was not either possible or expedient to fill up the vacancies. No doubt, the proviso to Section 25 vests a wide discretion in the Court to supersede arbitration, the power is required to be exercised with caution and circumspection. In the impugned order, however, I fail to find that the Court purported to supersede the arbitration.