PROVIDENT FUND INSPECTOR Vs. HARJIT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are that New Midh Bhabra Company (Private) Ltd. , Group A Batala, was an establishment within the meaning of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The respondents were persons in charge of that establishment and were responsible for the conduct of its business. They were required to comply with all the provisions of this Act and the scheme and the family pension scheme in respect of the said establishment. Under Para 38 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, they were required to pay the administrative charges for every month within 15 days of the close of that month but in spite of several requests they failed to pay the administrative charges from February 1977 to April 1977, and thus committed offences under Para 38 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 read with Sectionsl4aa and 14a of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. 1952. Respondent, Harjit Singh, was incharge of the establishment and responsible for the conduct of its business. On these allegations, the Provident Fund Inspector, Batala, filed complaint against the respondents. The respondents were tried for non compliance of the provisions and vide judgment, dated 19th March 1982, recorded by Sri N. S. Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Batala, Harjit Singh, respondent, was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500, in default of payment of fine he was to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Against this judgment recording conviction the respondents filed an appeal which was accepted by Sri T. S. Cheema, the learned Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, vide judgment, dated 17 August 1982. The conviction and sentence awarded to Harjit Singh, respondent were held without jurisdiction and were set a ide. Dissatisfied with this judgment, the Provident Fund Inspector, Batala, filed the present appeal.

(2.) WE have heard Sri S. K. Saxena, advocate for the appellant, and Sri R. L. Gupta, advocate for the respondents, and have perused the record.

(3.) THE only allegation against Harjit Singh, respondent was that he was in charge of the establishment and was responsible for the conduct of its business but he had not deposited the administrative charges for the months of February 1977 to April 1977. The complaint against the respondents was filed on 7 January 1981, i. e. , about four years after the alleged commission of offence. The learned lower Appellate Court had accepted the appeal on the ground that the Trial Court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction of the complaint and illegally held the trial as the complaint was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation. The period of limitation commenced from the date of the offence. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that the offence of not depositing the administrative charges within the prescribed time was a continuing offence and the complaint could be filed at any time. He contended that the complaint was not barred by limitation and the findings of the learned lower Appellate Court were opposed to the ratio or the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi AIR 1973 S. C. 908. We find that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is well merited and conviction of the respondents could not be set aside on the short ground that the complaint was filed beyond the period of limitation. The lower Appellate Court had placed reliance on Deokaran case (vide supra ). But this case was referred in a latter case Bhagirath Kanoria and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh with Bahadur Singh v. Provident Fund Inspector 1984 II LLN 731, and it was observed that the decision of the Court in Deokaran case (vide supra), to the effect that failure to furnish returns before the due date is not a continuing offence must be, confined to cases of failure to furnish returns. It cannot be extended to cases like those before us in which, the contravention is not of a procedural or formal nature and goes against the very gain of the statute under consideration. In this later authority it was further held in Para 21, at Page 136: